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Ten  Years  of  Mrs.  T. 
Introduction 
Throughout  the  Sixties  and  Seventies  Britain's economic  performance 
deteriorated.  Economists  queued  up with  their prognoses,  but without 
any noticeable effect. Then came Mrs. Thatcher. Her favourite economist 
was  Adam  Smith  with  a respectful  nod  to Milton Friedman,  and  since 
1979 her government  has set about rolling back the frontiers of the state. 
In doing  so she broke decisively  with the postwar consensus  on the role 
of the state in the economy. 
Early assessments  of the Thatcher economic  revolution,  such as Buiter 
and Miller (1981, 1983), were perhaps  too early to appraise the success of 
the  new  regime.  A  more  complete  assessment  on  ten years  should  be 
possible,  and  there has  been  a veritable flood  of eulogies  and epitaphs 
(e.g.,  Burns,  1988; Layard and  Nickell,  1989; Matthews  and  Minford, 
1987; Maynard,  1988; Walters, 1986). Yet in some  ways  the waters are as 
murky  as  ever,  for  while  it  is  relatively  easy  to  document  what  has 
happened,  it is harder to say what would  have happened  under alterna- 
tive policies.  Would the benefits  have  been  greater or the costs  smaller 
under an alternative  set of policies? That, unfortunately, is a question  to 
which  we  can never know  the answer. 
However,  we  can at least  assess  the Thatcher programme  against  its 
stated  objectives.  Table 1 provides  snapshots  of the British economy  at 
the  start of  Mrs.  Thatcher's  administration  (which  coincides  with  the 
peak of the previous  cycle),  at the trough of the recession  in 1981 and in 
1988 (which  may well  turn out to be another business  cycle peak). 
From a macroeconomic  perspective  the  immediate  objective  in  1979 
was  to achieve  a steady  and  sustained  reduction  in the rate of inflation 
through  monetary  control.  To limit upward  pressure  on  interest  rates, 14 *  BEAN  & SYMONS 
peak of the previous  cycle),  at the trough of the recession  in 1981 and in 
1988 (which  may well  turn out to be another business  cycle peak). 
From a macroeconomic  perspective  the  immediate  objective  in  1979 
was  to achieve  a steady  and  sustained  reduction in the rate of inflation 
through  monetary  control.  To limit upward  pressure  on  interest  rates, 
the monetary  targets  were  part of an overall framework-the  Medium 
Term Financial Strategy (MTFS)-which  envisaged  a decline in the gov- 
ernment's  borrowing  requirements  over a number of years. The govern- 
ment also promised  a reduction  in government  spending  and taxes but, 
unlike the Reagan programme,  there was to be no dabbling in the black 
arts of  the  Laffer curve.  Tax cuts  would  come  only  when  the  govern- 
ment's  financial position  allowed. 
The primary objective-the  achievement  of a low and relatively steady 
rate of inflation-clearly  has been  achieved,  current "blips" aside.  Simi- 
larly the public sector borrowing  requirement  (PSBR) has swung  from a 
large deficit  to what  is now  quite a sizable  surplus,  and for this reason 
has  now  been  renamed  the  public  sector debt repayment  (PSDR). The 
share of government  spending  in total output,  and with  it the share of 
taxes, however,  has changed  rather little until the last year or two.  (This 
is not simply  due  to increased  transfer payments  stemming  from higher 
unemployment;  the  share  of  government  expenditure  on  goods  and 
services  in  GDP  was  19.8% in  1987 against  19.7% in  1979.) The  next 
section  of the paper  discusses  in more detail this aspect  of the govern- 
ment's record, and in particular the role of the PSBR targets in the MTFS. 
Table  1  SELECTED  UK ECONOMIC  STATISTICS 
1979  1981  1988 
GDPa  100.0  96.7  121.0 
Manufacturing  output  100.0  85.9  107.8 
Output/head  100.0  99.9  121.3 
Manufacturing  output/head  100.0  99.5  148.1 
Unemployment rate  4.9  9.4  8.6 
Long-term  unemployment rate (more than 12 months)  1.2  2.1  3.5 
Retail  price inflation  13.4  11.9  4.9 
Real  earnings  100.0  105.3  126.0 
Real  earnings (Male  manuals, lowest decile)  100.0  102.1  107.0 
Profit share (% of GDPb)  20.4  16.5  21.0 
Public Sector Debt Repayment  (% of GDPc)  -6.4  -4.1  2.4 
Government  expenditure  (% of GDPC)  43.4  46.1  38.6 
Tax Revenue  (% of GDPC)  34.1  37.8  37.2 
Current account  (% of GDPC)  -0.3  2.7  -3.1 
Notes:  (a)  Average  of income,  output  and expenditure  measures 
(b)  At factor cost 
(c)  At market prices 
Source:  Economic  Trends, Employment  Gazette, and New Earnings Survey Ten  Years  of  Mrs. T - 15 
As  far as  the  real  side  of  the  economy  goes,  the  picture  is  mixed. 
Furthermore  the  perspective  is  very  different  viewed  from  1979  (fa- 
voured  by critics of Mrs. Thatcher) and  1981 (preferred by supporters). 
The annual  growth  rate of output  is an anaemic  2.1% judged  from the 
former, but  a healthy  3.3% from the  latter. There is no  doubt  that the 
record on unemployment  has until recently been  rather bad, while  that 
on  productivity  has  been  relatively  good.  The  unemployment  rate, 
which peaked  at 11.8% in 1985, has reached levels  second  only to those 
experienced  during  the Great Depression.  Almost  all of this increase in 
unemployment  is due to an increase in duration rather than an increased 
probability of unemployment,  resulting  in a large increase in those who 
have  been  unemployed  for  a  year  or  more.  Reasons  for  this  rise  in 
unemployment  are discussed  in Section 2 of the paper. 
Productivity growth of 2.2% per annum (4.5% in manufacturing) since 
1979 may not seem  startling to the average Japanese (or German) reader, 
but it does  represent  a significant  improvement  over Britain's past rec- 
ord, both in absolute  and relative terms. The sources  and sustainability 
of this resurgence  in productivity  are discussed  in Section 3. 
Alongside  this  acceleration  in  productivity  has  been  a sharp  rise in 
average real (pre-tax) earnings.  However  as Section 4 details, the inequal- 
ity between  both pre- and post-tax incomes  has risen greatly during the 
Thatcher  years,  with  the  result  that  the  real incomes  of  those  at  the 
bottom  end  of  the  income  distribution  have  hardly  risen  at all.  Gains 
there may have been from the Thatcher years, but they have been shared 
very unequally. 
1. Inflation  and the Public  Finances 
The immediate  objective of the government  after its election in 1979 was 
the  eradication  of  inflation.  To this  end  it instituted  a Medium  Term 
Financial Strategy (MTFS) embodying  guidelines  for both monetary and 
fiscal policies  over  a rolling  four-year  horizon.  In particular the  MTFS 
envisaged  a steady  reduction  in nominal GDP growth through a gradual 
reduction  in the rate of growth  of the money  stock (?M3), accompanied 
by a declining  path for the PSBR. 
Targets for ?M3 were  not  new,  having  been  first introduced  by  the 
Labour government  in 1977. The MTFS, however,  was  different in pro- 
viding  target ranges  for a number  of years ahead.  Unfortunately,  in the 
first  two  years  of  the  strategy,  ?M3  vastly  overshot  its  target  range 
(18.4% in 1980 and 16.3% in 1981 as against targets of 7-11% and 6-10%) 
leading  both  to a further tightening  of monetary  policy  and to upward 
revision  of  the  ranges  in  ensuing  MTFSs. This led  some  observers  to 16 *  BEAN  & SYMONS 
claim that monetary  conditions  were far too loose and the rampant infla- 
tion (retail price inflation peaked at 22% in May 1980) was a consequence 
of this monetary  laxity. 
With hindsight  it is clear that this was  incorrect and that the country 
was  in the  grip of a tight monetary  squeeze.  The rate of growth  of the 
monetary base  slowed  from 12.1% in 1979 to 2.6% in 1981. Furthermore 
the nominal exchange  rate appreciated by no less than a quarter between 
the beginning  of 1979 and the end  of 1980, resulting  in a similar loss of 
competitiveness.  Some  of this is certainly due  to North Sea oil-in  par- 
ticular the revaluation  of oil rents in the wake of OPEC II-but  a variety 
of studies  using  different approaches  all point to a real appreciation from 
oil of around  8-12%  (see  Bean 1987, for a survey).  Although  there are 
some  difficulties  in  squaring  a monetary  explanation  of the rest of the 
appreciation  with  the  ex  post  behaviour  of  interest  differentials  (see 
Buiter and Miller 1983), it seems  reasonable to attribute a significant part 
of the remaining  13-17% to the monetary  squeeze. 
In any case the outturn  for nominal  GDP growth  seems  to have been 
pretty much as the government  would  have hoped.  Bums (1988) reports 
internal  figures  lying  behind  the  1980 MTFS which  envisaged  a reduc- 
tion in nominal  GDP growth  from 17.5% in the financial year 1979-80  to 
9.6% in 1982-83.  The outturn for 1982-83 was in fact 9.2%. Where things 
went  somewhat  awry was  in the split between  inflation and real output 
growth in 1980 and 1981. Since then,  despite  continued  misbehaviour  of 
the  monetary  aggregates  due  to  financial  innovation,  nominal  GDP 
growth has been fairly steady, ranging between  7% and 10%  per annum. 
1.1 THE  PSBR  TARGETS 
That some  sort of monetary  deceleration  would  be associated  with  the 
disinflation  process  is relatively  uncontroversial,  although  it is open  to 
debate  whether  the  disinflation  could  have  been  less  painfully  accom- 
plished.  A natural alternative for instance would  have been an exchange 
rate  target,  perhaps  within  the  EMS.  An  incomes  policy  might  have 
provided  a second  nominal  anchor (more on this below).  An interesting 
issue,  however,  is  the  role  played  by  the  targets  for the.PSBR  in  the 
MTFS. Were they  important  in  the  disinflationary  process  and,  if so, 
how? 
In the original 1980 MTFS, the PSBR, as a percentage  of GDP, was set 
to decline  steadily  from 4.7% in 1979-80  to 1.5% in 1983-84.  However, 
as Table 2 shows,  it took the government  considerably  longer to reduce 
the PSBR than was originally intended  in the 1980 MTFS. In fact progress 
has  been  even  less  dramatic,  for  the  PSBR treats  the  proceeds  from 
privatisation as a form of negative  capital expenditure  rather than a way Ten  Years  of Mrs. T  17 
of  financing  the  deficit.  The  Public  Sector  Financial  Deficit/Surplus 
(PSFD/PSFS) instead  treats privatisation  proceeds  as a form of finance 
and  thus  gives  a  more  accurate  picture  of  the  pressures  government 
policy is putting  on the capital markets. Table 2 shows  that this changed 
remarkably little until the rapid growth  of the last few years swelled  tax 
receipts. 
The  overrun  of  the  PSBR targets  in  the  wake  of  the  deeper-than- 
expected  recession  of 1980-81  is an indication  that they  did not consti- 
tute an unconditional  rule for fiscal policy. However,  it is clear that the 
permitted  overrun was  less  pronounced  than could have been expected 
under previous  administrations.  Table 2 also contains  the OECD's cycli- 
cally corrected measure  of the budget  deficit which gives an indication of 
the "discretionary" changes  in fiscal policy (although it does not necessar- 
ily provide  a good  measure  of the  impact  of policy  on  demand).  This 
shows  policy tightening  in 1980 and, especially,  1981 when  the economy 
was  undergoing  its severest  slump  since  the early Thirties. Thus while 
fiscal policy  has  not  been  unconditional,  it has  been  considerably  less 
responsive  to short-run  fluctuations  in activity than in the past,  reflect- 
ing  the  government's  emphasis  on  medium  and  long-term  objectives. 
1.2 INTEREST  RATES  AND THE  MTFS 
So much for what happened  to the PSBR. What has the fiscal part of the 
MTFS achieved?  It is helpful  to start by recording what the government 
thought it would  achieve.  The  1980 MTFS gave  the  following  rationale: 
Table  2  THE  PUBLIC  FINANCES  (%  OF GDP AT MARKET  PRICES) 
Cyclically  Oil  Permanent 
PSDR  PSFSa  Adjusted  PSFS  Revenues  Income  PSFS 
1970  0.0  1.3  5.0  0.0  6.8 
1975  -9.6  -7.2  1.1  0.0  -0.3 
1978  -4.9  -5.0  -1.0  0.4  -0.1 
1979  -6.4  -4.3  0.9  1.3  0.2 
1980  -5.1  -4.5  2.1  1.8  -0.1 
1981  -4.1  -3.1  5.3  3.0  0.2 
1982  -1.8  -2.7  5.6  3.3  0.2 
1983  -3.8  -3.4  3.7  3.4  -0.6 
1984  -3.2  -4.0  3.2  4.3  -2.3 
1985  -2.1  -2.7  3.6  3.8  -0.6 
1986  -0.6  -2.1  3.1  1.5  0.8 
1987  0.4  -1.1  3.0  1.1  2.2 
Note:  (a) Excludes  certain  other financial  transactions  as well as privatisation  proceeds. 
Sources:  Economic  Trends,  Financial  Statement  and Budget  Report,  OECD  Economic  Outlook,  (various)  and 
Begg (1987). 18 *  BEAN & SYMONS 
It is not the intention to achieve this reduction  in monetary  growth by excessive 
reliance on interest rates. The consequence  of the high level of public sector 
borrowing  has been high nominal interest rates and greater  financing problems 
for the private sector. If interest rates are to be brought  down to acceptable  levels 
the PSBR must be substantially reduced  as a proportion  of GDP over the next 
few years (Financial Statement  and Budget Report, 1980-81). 
It is clear that the  government's  primary argument  for the PSBR tar- 
gets  was  to prevent  the crowding-out  of investment  that might occur if 
the private  sector was  asked  to absorb increasing  quantities  of govern- 
ment  debt.  This  rationale  was  severely  criticised  at the  time  by  such 
diverse  economists  as  Dornbusch,  Friedman,  Laidler, and  Kaldor (see 
Treasury and Civil Service Committee  1981), and does  not look stronger 
with  hindsight.  Nominal  short-term  interest  rates  have  never  fallen 
much below  9% since 1979 and are currently almost as high as when  the 
government  took  office.  Real short-term  interest  rates-approximately 
zero in 1978-have  averaged around 4% over the last five years. Further- 
more,  this  is  not  because  of  a fiscal-inspired  recovery  in  investment; 
investment  in  1978 stood  at 18.5% of GDP while  over  1983-87  it aver- 
aged only  16.8%. 
Of  course,  other  things  have  changed  since  1980. In particular the 
level  of world  real interest  rates has  risen dramatically. But this merely 
serves  to emphasize  the fundamental  weakness  in the basic argument; 
namely  that real interest  rates are determined  primarily in international 
capital markets.  Empirical evidence  suggests  that the effects of changes 
in the  relative  supplies  of  different  assets  has  relatively  little effect  on 
real interest differentials  (e.g.,  Frankel 1985), and once this is recognised 
the original rationale for the PSBR targets looks distinctly shaky. 
1.3 SOLVENCY  AND THE  MTFS 
An  alternative  rationale  advanced  for  the  PSBR targets  is  that  it  en- 
hanced  the credibility of the government's  monetary  targets. According 
to this line of argument,  sustained  budget  deficits now  must be associ- 
ated  with  either  budget  surpluses  or increased  monetisation  in the fu- 
ture. A lower rate of monetary  growth today can thus engender  expecta- 
tions of higher future inflation unless  accompanied  by a reduction in the 
fiscal deficit (Sargent and Wallace 1981). 
Is this argument  relevant to the UK? Start by recalling that the govern- 
ment  budget  identity  implies  that for a given  debt-income  ratio, b, the 
rate of inflation,  wT,  is given  by 
IT=  v[d+(r-n)b]-n  (1) Ten  Years  of  Mrs. T  .  19 
where  v is the  velocity  of high-powered  money  (assumed  constant  for 
simplicity),  d is the primary deficit as a proportion  of GDP, r is the real 
interest rate and n is the rate of growth of the economy  (r > n). It follows 
that  the  nominal  deficit  must  certainly  fall if inflation  is  to be  perma- 
nently lower,  as also must the primary deficit. If these cuts are not made 
at the same  time as any cut in monetary  growth,  there is a danger that 
private agents  will  be led  to expect  higher  monetary  growth  and infla- 
tion in the future rather than fiscal retrenchment. 
The first point to note is that seigniorage  has never been an important 
source of revenue  in the UK because  the velocity of circulation is so high 
(roughly  20).  During  the  Seventies  seigniorage  averaged  0.8% of GDP, 
and  half  that in the  Eighties.  Since  a 10 percentage  point  reduction  in 
inflation calls for a reduction  of the primary deficit of around  .5 percent- 
age  point,  and  the  political  costs  of inflation  are high,  it is much  more 
likely  that a future  government  would  resort to conventional  taxation 
rather than  the  printing  presses  in  order  to  cover  the  increased  debt 
service resulting  from a lower rate of monetary  expansion  today. Conse- 
quently  an essential  ingredient  of the  Sargent-Wallace argument-that 
future primary deficits  are fixed independently  of the rate of monetary 
growth-would  seem  to be missing. 
More  relevant,  however,  is  the  existence  of  long-dated  nominally- 
denominated  debt.  Unanticipated  disinflation  represents  a windfall  sub- 
sidy to bondholders  which  has to be financed  from somewhere.  Conse- 
quently the primary deficit would  need to fall for as long as the overhang 
of  high  real  interest  payments  on  existing  long-dated  nominally- 
denominated  debt  lasts,  if the  debt-income  ratio were  not  to rise.  The 
problem with this line of argument  is that the government  could avoid a 
squeeze  on  the  primary  deficit  by  carrying out  a swap  of indexed  for 
non-indexed  debt prior to initiating its disinflationary programme. Nomi- 
nal interest payments  would  then decline  with inflation. 
An  associated  argument  is  that  the  existence  of  nominally-denom- 
inated  debt  encourages  governments  to  indulge  in  bouts  of  unantici- 
pated inflation  to expropriate bondholders.  The mere announcement  of 
a low  inflation  path  may  thus  not  be  credible.  Sticking  to  the  PSBR 
targets  was  one  way  of  building  up  the  credibility  of  its  monetary 
programme.  The  problem  is  that,  as before,  the  authorities  can avoid 
this problem  of time inconsistency  by issuing  indexed  debt before initi- 
ating  the  disinflationary  programme  while  it  still  lacked  credibility. 
Now  although  the  government  has  been  issuing  indexed  stock  since 
1980 it  still  constitutes  only  11% of  the  face value  of  the  outstanding 
debt,  and thus  falls well  short of a full debt swap.  Possibly  the govern- 
ment  had  not  realised  that  it  could  avoid  the  pains  of  building  up 20 *  BEAN  & SYMONS 
credibility through  this simple  device; it seems  more likely that both the 
government  and  the  private  sector  (which  seemed  reluctant  to absorb 
large quantities  of indexed  debt) simply  did not regard the time incon- 
sistency  problem as serious. 
A  third line  of  argument  is  that the  initial levels  of the  deficit were 
unsustainable.  The  primary  deficit  between  1978 and  1980 averaged 
around  2.33% of GDP. Given  a net debt-income  ratio of a fraction over 
40% and  a  real  growth  corrected  interest  rate  of  1-2%,  equation  (1) 
implies  a  steady-state  inflation  rate  of  around  50%. Although  such  a 
situation  does  not require that adjustment  be made  today, correction of 
an unsustainable  financial plan has to begin  sometime. 
To see  whether  existing  fiscal plans  were  ex ante unsustainable,  start 
by  noting  that  the  government  comprehensive  balance  sheet  requires 
that (Buiter 1985): 
G=  Present value  of exhaustive  consumption  spending 
l+  present  value of transfers,  grants and subsidies 
(Public  sector net assets  (financial and real) 
-_  + present  value of taxes  =W. 
+  present  value of seigniorage 
+ present  value  of public sector capital formation programme 
If R is the real long-term  interest  rate, then  the indefinitely  sustainable 
flow of government  spending  is given by the annuity value of net worth, 
RW, and a measure  of the fiscal elbow room the government  is bequeath- 
ing to its successors  is given  by the  "permanent income  deficit" (Buiter 
1985), g-RW,  where  g  is  the  flow  of  real consumption  spending  and 
transfers. If this is negative  then future governments  will have to reduce 
future spending  or increase net worth,  e.g.,  by raising taxes. 
Begg  (1987) has  calculated  a time series  for this quantity, assuming  a 
constant  share  of  non-oil  taxes  in  output  and  his  figures  have  been 
updated  for Table 2. Compared  to the conventional  PSFD/PSFS there are 
three important  adjustments.  First, the debt burden  is evaluated  at the 
long-term  real interest  rate. Second,  North Sea oil taxes are replaced by 
their  permanent  income  equivalent  (based  on  the  prevailing  real  oil 
price). Third, half of the public  sector investment  programme  in dwell- 
ings and public corporations are deducted  on the (conservative) assump- 
tion  that this  half yields  cash  returns  to the government  at the market 
rate. The figures indicate that the permanent  income deficit was roughly 
zero in 1979, suggesting  no obvious  sustainability  with existing  taxation 
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Finally a number of industrial countries have carried through success- 
ful  disinflationary  programmes  without  fiscal  retrenchment.  Ireland 
(Dombusch  1989) and Italy (Giavazzi and Spaventa  1989) are two cases 
in point.  Both of these  countries have net debt-income  ratios in excess of 
90%. In addition  the United States has managed  to combine low inflation 
with  growing  public debt,  albeit from a low base.  Fiscal correction may 
often  be  an  essential  part of a disinflationary  programme,  particularly 
where  capital markets are thin and seigniorage  is important, but it is not 
obvious  that it was  necessary  in the British case. 
1.4 THE  MTFS  AND THE  CHANGE  IN REGIME 
So what have the PSBR targets achieved? We think two things.  First, at a 
rather mundane  level,  the  setting  of PSBR targets has brought  the two 
sides  of the public accounts,  expenditure  and revenue,  together.  In the 
UK, public  spending  plans  have  always  been  laid out  in  the  autumn, 
whereas  taxation decisions  have been made at budget time in the spring, 
with only a rather tenuous  link between  the two processes.  There is now 
a greater awareness  that spending  and taxation are two sides of the same 
coin and the increases in the spending  of one department must come out 
of another department's  allocation,  or increased  taxation. 
The second  achievement  was to establish the credibility of the govern- 
ment  as a "tough" one  that would  not accommodate  inflationary wage 
demands  through  expansionary  macroeconomic  policies.  In particular 
the  1981 budget  was  a  watershed  in  which  policy  tightened  despite 
high  and  rising  unemployment.  At a time  when  the  monetary  targets 
were  being  overshot  by  a considerable  margin,  this  was  an important 
signal  of an irrevocable break with  the past  (see  Buiter and Miller 1983 
and  Begg  1987,  for  a  similar  view).  However,  it  was  not  simply  a 
disavowal  of  Keynesian  stabilisation  policies  that represented  a break 
with  the  past.  Equally significant  was  the fact that it signalled  the end 
of  attempts  to  sustain  a  cooperative  low  unemployment  equilibrium 
through  the use  of neo-corporatist  policies.  This is a theme  we  develop 
in the next section. 
2. Unemployment 
The reduction  in inflation,  the  stabilisation  of the  public finances,  and 
the  resurgence  in  productivity  (discussed  in  Section  3)  are  the  most 
conspicuous  economic  successes  of the Thatcher years.  The most  obvi- 
ous failure has been the level of unemployment,  plotted in the first panel 
of Figure 1. Critics have blamed this on the government's  contractionary 
fiscal  and  monetary  policies.  But  the  defence  of  the  government  has 22 - BEAN  & SYMONS 
been  to  argue  that,  while  deplorable,  the  unemployment  is  a conse- 
quence  of private sector decisions  and not government  actions. 
We begin by putting  the UK's unemployment  experience in an interna- 
tional context. Most of the industrialised  countries went through a bout of 
disinflation  during  the first half of the Eighties.  Were the effects of this 
worse in the UK than elsewhere?  Table 3 reports inflation and unemploy- 
ment rates in 1980 and 1985 in the UK and a number of other countries. 
The final column,  the "sacrifice ratio," reports the ratio of the cumulated 
excess of the unemployment  rate over its 1980 level during this period to 
the  reduction  in inflation.  Of course,  since  unemployment  could  have 
risen  because  of  adverse  supply-side  developments  as  well  as  coun- 
terinflationary macroeconomic  policies,  this does not necessarily provide 
an accurate measure of the costs of disinflation, but it does at least provide 
a rather crude indicator of comparative  macroeconomic  performance. 
Compared  to Japan, Sweden  and the U.S.-three  countries with very 
different  economic  and  institutional  structures-British  performance 
was rather poor. However,  her comparative performance is rather better 
compared to the rest of the European Community; Germany for instance 
fared especially  badly  under  the  sacrifice ratio criterion.  However,  the 
most  obvious  comparison,  in terms of similarity of initial conditions,  is 
with Italy. Viewed  in this light, British performance looks somewhat  less 
satisfactory. 
The  fact  that  unemployment  may  be  widespread  in  the  European 
Community  does  not,  however,  necessarily  absolve  the  Conservative 
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government  from  all  responsibility.  Many  of  the  policies  followed  by 
Mrs. Thatcher have been  emulated  by other European governments,  so 
the  common  unemployment  experience  could  simply  reflect common 
policies,  as  well  as  common  exogenous  shocks  which  may  have  also 
tended  to raise the equilibrium  rate of unemployment.  We must  there- 
fore delve  a little  deeper  into  the  forces behind  the  movements  in the 
British unemployment  rate. 
2.1 THE  DETERMINANTS  OF THE  NATURAL  RATE 
We start by considering  factors that may have  raised the natural rate of 
unemployment  (meaning  the  rate  of  unemployment  at  which  wage- 
setters' intended  markup  of wages  over prices is consistent  with  price- 
setters'  intended  markup  of  prices  over  wages).  The following  list in- 
cludes  most  of the obvious  candidates:  the tax and import price wedge; 
the benefit  system;  skill and regional mismatch; and union  power.  Time 
series  of these  variables  are also  plotted  in Figure 1 and  are discussed 
further below. 
2.1.1  Taxes  and Import  Prices  Workers care about the purchasing  power 
of  wages  post-tax,  while  for firms  the  relevant  variable is  the  cost  of 
labour in  terms  of  the  price  of  its  output.  Anything  that changes  the 
"wedge" between  post-tax consumption  wages  and own-product  labour 
costs could affect equilibrium unemployment.  An argument that is often 
Table  3  COMPARATIVE  INFLATION  AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
PERFORMANCE 
Unemploy- 
Inflationa  mentb  --  --  ------  "Sacrifice 
1980  1985  1980  1985  Ratio"' 
Germany  4.9  2.3  3.0  7.2  6.8 
France  11.6  5.9  6.3  10.2  2.1 
Italy  21.5  9.2  7.5  10.1  0.7 
Japan  3.9  1.5  2.0  2.6  1.0 
Sweden  11.9  6.9  2.0  2.8  0.4 
United Kingdom  19.1  5.8  6.4  11.2  1.8 
United States  9.1  3.0  7.0  7.1  1.0 
Notes: (a) GNP/GDP  deflator. 
(b) Standardised  unemployment  rate. 
(c)  (Unemployment -  Unemployment98)  /[Col.()  -  Col.(2)] 
OECD  Economic  Outlook,  December  1988.  Source:  OECD  Economic  Outlook,  December  1988. 24 *  BEAN  & SYMONS 
advanced  to explain the initial rise in unemployment  in 1974-75 is that it 
was  the  outcome  of  attempts  by  labour  to  maintain  the  consumption 
wage  in the face of the deterioration  in the terms of trade due to the first 
oil price shock. 
Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows  an upward  movement  in the total wedge 
from the mid-1960s  due  primarily to increasing  income  tax rates, while 
in the 1973-75  period we see a second  widening  in the wedge  due to the 
terms of trade deterioration.  There are, however,  good reasons for believ- 
ing that an increase  in the wedge  should  not permanently  raise equilib- 
rium unemployment.  The reason  is that in most  optimising  models  the 
wedge  affects unemployment  only via the consumption  wage.  This has 
increased  manyfold  since the Dark Ages,  but without  much altering the 
unemployment  rate.  Thus  one  might  expect  changes  in  the  wedge  to 
have  at most  a transitory  effect  (a finding  that is confirmed  by Newell 
and Symons  1985). 
2.1.2  Benefits  An increase  in the generosity  of unemployment  benefits 
should  make  workers  more  willing  to risk unemployment  or be  more 
selective  about accepting  job offers if they are unemployed.  Panel (c) of 
Figure 1 plots  the ratio of supplementary  benefit  to the lowest  decile of 
manual  earnings  after taxes  (since  most  unemployed  can expect  to go 
into  lowly  paid  manual  jobs).  While  there  was  a big  increase  in  the 
replacement  ratio in the mid-Sixties,  it has since risen little, and there is 
nothing  with  which  to associate  the  upward  movement  in unemploy- 
ment.  Of course,  the way benefits  are administered  may be more impor- 
tant and,  in particular, the vigour with which  the work-test is enforced. 
Layard and Nickell  (1987) suggest  that,  until recently at least,  attitudes 
had  indeed  become  more  lenient  in  this  regard.  Furthermore,  as  dis- 
cussed  below,  the characteristics of the benefit system  may be important 
in understanding  the dynamics  of unemployment. 
2.1.3 Mismatch  One common  explanation  of the increase in unemploy- 
ment lies in the impact of new  technology,  especially computers,  and the 
effect of increasing  competition  in traditional industries  from Japan and 
the NICs. This has made the human capital of a large portion of the work 
force redundant,  especially  manual workers in the traditional manufac- 
turing industries  like cars and  shipbuilding.  If firms in the  South  East 
want skilled computer  operators,  a large pool of unemployed  welders  on 
Tyneside  will  be  of  little  help  to  them  in  filling  vacancies.  But,  if re- 
training and relocation  is costly, the unemployed  may choose  to remain 
where  they  are in the hope  of getting  their old jobs back in due course. 
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the type/location  of unemployment  can therefore be expected  to reduce 
the efficiency  of the  process  of matching  unemployed  workers  to jobs, 
resulting  in higher equilibrium unemployment. 
Appealing  as this line of argument  may be, it does  not receive strong 
empirical  support.  A  direct  measure  of  mismatch  can  be  based  on  a 
comparison  of the  share  (in total unemployment)  of unemployment  in 
a  particular  category  (skill/location/industry)  with  the  share  (in  total 
vacancies)  of  vacancies  of  the  same  category.  Such  measures  do  not 
reveal increased  skill or regional  mismatch  (in fact the latter appears to 
have  been  falling  in  recent  times);  only  industrial  mismatch  seems  to 
have increased  (Jackman and Roper 1987). Because this index  of indus- 
trial mismatch  is  only  available  for a short  period,  our empirical work 
below  employs  a measure  with  similar time  series  properties  based  on 
(a distributed  lag  of)  the  weighted  standard  deviation  of employment 
growth  rates across nine  major employment  categories.  This variable is 
plotted  in  panel  (d)  of  Figure  1 and  exhibits  a very  marked  increase 
over  1979-81,  after which  it falls back.  However  if industries  respond 
differently  to a common  aggregate  demand  shock,  movements  in this 
variable  could  reflect  aggregate  demand  shocks  as  well  as  sector- 
specific real shocks. 
2.1.4  Unions  Increased  union  power  will tend  to raise equilibrium un- 
employment  in most  models,  even  where  there is bargaining  over em- 
ployment.  To see  this  consider  the following  canonical case of a closed 
economy  composed  of n identical imperfectly  competitive  firms, each of 
which  faces  an  inverse  demand  function  Pi=SYi-E (E<1;  i=l,.,n)  and 
possesses  a Cobb-Douglas  technology  Yi=Nia (a<l).  Here Yi is output, 
Pi the firm's relative  price,  Ni is employment  and the demand  shift pa- 
rameter, 8, is a decreasing  function  of the general  price level.  The firm 
bargains with  a single  union  over wages  and employment.  Union utility 
is  given  by  the  utilitarian  utility  function  NiV(Wi) +  (M-Ni)V  where 
V(Wi) is the  utility  of an employed  worker,  Wi is the real consumption 
wage,  V is (expected)  utility for an unemployed  union member and M is 
the membership.  Wages and employment  in each firm are given  as the 
outcome  of a generalised  Nash  bargain between  management  and  the 
union: 
Max [V(Wi)  -  V]N,P(SNi'  -)-  WiNi) 
where  we  have  assumed  that the  status  quo  points  for the  union  and 
firm are MV and  zero respectively  and /8 is interpreted  as a measure  of 
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3V'I(V-V)  =  Ni/(sNl1-)-W,Ni) 
P3  +  [a(l  -6)N,l'-)--  WiN,]/[SNia(l--  W,Ni] =  0. 
Now  in a symmetric  equilibrium  Wi(=W) and Pi(=1) are the same for 
all firms.  Then  if V=(1-u)V(W)+uV(B),  where  u is the unemployment 
rate and B is benefits,  and assuming  for simplicity that V(W)= Wv/y  with 
y<l,  it follows  that the equilibrium unemployment  rate is given by: 
u =  [1 -a(1  -E)]3y/I[P+a(1-E)](1-pY) 
where p is the replacement  rate, B/W. Real wages  are given by: 
W =  [/3+a(1-E)]I/(1+O)[M(1-u)]1- 
It follows  that  an  increase  in  union  power  (an increase  in  3) will,  in 
general  equilibrium,  tend  to be associated  with  (i) a rise in unemploy- 
ment  (and  therefore  also  in  labour  productivity)  and  (ii) a rise in real 
wages.  The  argument  extends  to  other  environments,  including  the 
"right-to-manage"  model,  in  which  bargaining  takes  place  over  only 
wages. 
The impact  of union  power  on unemployment  will be ameliorated  if 
there is a secondary  sector in which  wages  are determined  competitively 
and wherein  workers who lose their jobs in the unionised  sector can find 
alternative  employment.  However,  if some  of these  workers  choose  to 
remain  unemployed  because  the  wage  in this  sector is less  than  their 
reservation wage,  an increase in aggregate unemployment  will still result. 
Union  density  is  the  most  obvious  choice  as  a  measure  of  union 
power.  As  panel  (e) of the  figure  shows,  this  rose  steadily  during  the 
Seventies,  but fell back during the Eighties.  Of course,  union  power is a 
multi-faceted  concept,  depending  on institutional  structure and the legal 
environment  as well  as simple  density,  but the series is consistent  with 
the  commonly  held  view  that  union  power  and  influence  was  at  its 
height  under the Labour governments  of the Seventies. 
In addition  to the question  of quantifying  union  power,  there is also 
the issue  of how  it is used.  Decentralised  bargaining by one union-firm 
pair may impose  externalities  on other bargaining units  (Blanchard and 
Kiyotaki  1987).  Moderation  in  wage  and  price  setting  will  then  raise 
employment  and welfare,  but is not individually  rational. This problem 
would  not  arise  in  a fully  competitive  economy,  and  one  approach  is 
thus  to limit union  and firm monopoly  power  with  the aim of approxi- 
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problem  arise  in  a fully  centralised  economy,  such  as in  Scandinavia, 
where  the  externalities  are  internalised.  A  halfway  house  with  de- 
centralised  unions  and  firms  with  market  power  is  the  worst  of  all 
worlds  (see  Calmfors  and  Driffill 1988). Unfortunately  it appears  to be 
the  one  inhabited  by  the  UK,  as  well  as  some  other  members  of  the 
European Community. 
During  the  Sixties  and  Seventies  successive  British  governments 
sought  to limit the adverse  effects of the decentralised  exercise of market 
power  through  the  development  of corporatist machinery,  such  as the 
tripartite National  Economic  Development  Council,  and  the  use  of in- 
comes  policy.  Such  policies  are best  thought  of  as  tools  to  lower  the 
equilibrium  rate  of  unemployment.  This  is  easily  seen  in  the  model 
above  where  the imposition  of a (binding)  side constraint  Wi<W neces- 
sarily produces  a lower  equilibrium unemployment  rate, u,p: 
u,p=  u/[l +,uW(1-py)/1^y] 
where  ,/  is the multiplier  on the incomes  policy  constraint and u is the 
unemployment  rate without  an incomes  policy. 
However,  the corporatist machinery and incomes policies in particular, 
proved  a very blunt weapon  for sustaining  the cooperative  equilibrium. 
An important characteristic of the British union movement  is the consider- 
able degree of autonomy  accorded to local shop stewards in representing 
their members'  interests.  This meant  that some  groups  of workers were 
able to negotiate  extra payments  through  more favourable overtime  ar- 
rangements,  etc.,  and thus exploit the moderation  of other groups,  pro- 
voking  discontent  among  workers  in less  favourable positions.  In addi- 
tion,  the  imposition  of incomes  policies  invariably hit those  groups  of 
workers due to settle contracts in the near future especially  hard, since it 
limited the extent to which  they could recoup losses  due to past unantici- 
pated inflation.  Finally firms sometimes  found incomes  policies inconve- 
nient,  as they limited the extent to which wages  could be raised to attract 
scarce labour or reward productivity  increases.  As a result incomes  poli- 
cies were  only politically feasible as a temporary measure. 
The long history  of incomes  policy is summarised  in the final panel of 
Figure 1. This series is due to Desai,  Keil, and Wadhwani (1984) and tries 
to measure  the intensity  as well  as the occurrence of an incomes  policy, 
by comparing  the intended  rate of inflation embodied  in the policy with 
the existing  rate. The most  recent experience  of an incomes  policy-the 
"Social Contract" under  the Callaghan government-was  initially rather 
successful  in  facilitating  the  first  bout  of  disinflation  during  1976-78 
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during the "Winter of Discontent"  in the first few  months  of 1979. This 
was  a significant,  perhaps  crucial, factor in the first election  victory of 
Mrs. Thatcher later that year. 
In the light  of this experience,  as well  as on ideological  grounds,  the 
Thatcher government  resolved  to have nothing  to do with incomes  poli- 
cies in particular and neo-corporatism  in general.  The private sector was 
to be free to make  its  own  decisions,  but would  have  to live  with  the 
consequences.  The government  chose  direct legislative  measures  to curb 
union power,  in particular the three Employment  Acts of 1980, 1982, and 
1984. The 1980 Employment  Act outlawed  mass secondary picketing and 
provided  employers  with  legal  remedies  against  secondary  action.  The 
1982 Employment  Act removed  the previous blanket immunity of unions 
in tort, and made union funds liable to sequestration in cases of unlawful 
disputes.  At the same time disputes  for political reasons were outlawed, 
union  labour-only  requirements  were  forbidden,  and  employers  were 
empowered  to dismiss  striking workers without  facing unfair dismissal 
claims.  The  1984 Employment  Act introduced  a variety of measures  to 
increase the democratic accountability of union leaders, in particular man- 
datory secret ballots of the membership  before undertaking strike action. 
Finally, other measures,  such as reducing employment  protection provi- 
sions  and  the  scope  of wage  councils,  also  tended  to weaken  unions. 
2.2 PERSISTENCE 
So far nothing  has been  said about the role of the demand  contraction in 
generating  high  unemployment.  Because  the effect of a demand  shock 
on  unemployment  should  last  only  as  long  as  it  takes  any  nominal 
inertia  to  work  its  way  out  of  the  economy  or  for  the  credibility  of 
macroeconomic  policies  to be established,  some  persistence  mechanism 
whereby  high  unemployment  today  raises  the  natural  rate  in  future 
periods is also required if demand  is to play much of a role in explaining 
continued  high  unemployment.  Two  main  channels  have  been  pro- 
posed,  one focussing  on the behaviour  of those with jobs (the insiders); 
the other highlights  on the behaviour  of the unemployed  (the outsiders). 
These  provide  a mechanism  whereby  temporary  demand  (or supply) 
shocks can have long-lasting  effects on unemployment  and output. 
Blanchard  and  Summers  (1986),  Gottfries  and  Horn  (1987),  and 
Lindbeck and  Snower  (1988) have  analysed  the first channel.  The idea, 
roughly  speaking,  is  that  the  insiders  fix  real  wages  to  ensure  their 
continued  employment.  If an adverse shock reduces the number of insid- 
ers (assuming  the unemployed  cease  to be members  of the union),  the 
next  period's  employment,  absent  further  unforeseen  shocks,  will  be 
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While  this  theory  has  a  ring  of  truth,  it  cannot  easily  explain  the 
outward  shift  in  the  unemployment-vacancy  relationship  which  oc- 
curred  in  most  high  unemployment  countries,  and  is  especially  pro- 
nounced  in  the  United  Kingdom.  None  of  the  extant  insider  models 
incorporate turnover,  but one would  expect the operation of the insider 
effect to be associated  with  a movement  along  a given  unemployment- 
vacancy curve rather than an outward  shift. To explain this one needs  to 
understand  why  the rate at which  unemployed  workers are matched  to 
vacant jobs has  fallen  so much.  The insider  mechanism  thus cannot be 
the whole  story. 
The idea behind the second channel is that a history of continued unem- 
ployment  itself reduces  the chances  of an unemployed  person  finding  a 
job. This mechanism  has been  stressed  especially  by Layard and Nickell 
(1986, 1987). To begin with there is clear evidence  that in all countries the 
exit rate from  unemployment  is  much  lower  for the  long-term  unem- 
ployed than for the freshly laid off. In Britain the rate is but one-tenth of its 
initial value  for those  who  have been  unemployed  over four years. Fur- 
thermore, as was made clear in the introduction,  most of the rise in British 
unemployment  has been due to reduced overflow and increased duration 
rather than the increased  frequency  of spells of unemployment. 
Although  this  decline  in  exit  rates  could  just  be  a  consequence  of 
heterogeneity  among  the  unemployed,  there are a number  of ways  in 
which genuine  duration dependence  might arise. First, the human capi- 
tal of the  unemployed  depreciates,  making  them  less  attractive to em- 
ployers.  Second,  firms may use  the unemployment  history  of a worker 
as a screening  device  so  that long  duration  is taken as a signal  of low 
productivity.  Finally, the unemployed  might become  progressively  more 
disillusioned  and apathetic  as duration lengthens,  leading  to less inten- 
sive search activity. 
There  is  some  evidence  which  suggests  that  this  mechanism  helps 
account for the outward shift in the unemployment-vacancy  relationship 
(Budd,  Levine,  and  Smith  1986; Franz 1987) as well  as why  the down- 
ward pressure  on  wages  is  so  limited  at the  present  time  (Layard and 
Nickell,  1987). Clearly, however,  its importance is likely to vary with the 
generosity  and,  especially,  the duration  of unemployment  benefits.  We 
test this proposition  below. 
2.3 EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE 
There have  been  an enormous  number  of studies  of British and  Euro- 
pean unemployment.  Most of these provide estimates  of, at a minimum, 
a labour  demand/price-setting  relationship  and  a labour supply/wage- 
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such  models  are not  to everybody's  taste.  Rather than provide  yet  an- 
other set of estimates  of a small macro model,  we  instead  provide  esti- 
mates of a reduced  form unemployment  equation,  leaving  the reader to 
put his  or her own  interpretation  on  the underlying  structure.  Specifi- 
cally we assume  that: 
Ut  = Aut*  +  (1-A)u,t-  +  Et  (2) 
where ut  is the "long-run" natural rate and is a function of the variables 
discussed  above,  ut_l captures  insider  and outsider  persistence  mecha- 
nisms  (as well as any dynamics  inherent in the matching process),  and Et 
reflects the effect of demand  shocks which drive the unemployment  rate 
away from its instantaneous  natural rate. In a New  Classical model with 
incomplete  information  this  would  simply  be proportional  to the price 
"surprise." In a world  in which  wages  and prices are set to clear labour 
and  goods  markets  ex ante,  but  are fixed  ex post  because  of menu  or 
transaction costs,  it would  reflect instead a quantity "surprise." In either 
case, under rational expectations,  the forecast errors should be orthogo- 
nal to available  information.  (We also  tried proxying  nominal  demand 
shocks directly with the change  in the rate of inflation and the change in 
the  rate of  growth  of  nominal  income;  this  left the  coefficients  on  the 
other  variables  virtually  unchanged.)  The error term could,  of course, 
reflect other factors driving  the natural rate, but which  have been omit- 
ted from the  equation.  Finally, both  a rise in taxes and a fall in import 
prices will be associated  with  a decline  in the demand  for domestically 
produced  goods,  and  hence  may be correlated with  the error. For this 
reason  the  change  in  the  tax-import  price  wedge  is  entered  into  the 
equation lagged; in practice only the income  tax component  turns out to 
be important. 
In addition  to the variables already discussed  we  include  the propor- 
tion of the working  population  born after 1930. One of us has suggested 
that  labour  has  become  more  willing  to  risk unemployment  as  fewer 
workers are able to recall the experience  of mass unemployment  during 
the  interwar  years  (Newell  and  Symons  1988). However,  the  trended 
nature  of  this  variable  means  that it may  also  act as a control for any 
omitted  but trended  variable which  affects the natural rate. In any case 
one would  want  to be wary of projecting its effects into the future. 
To maximise  the  rather limited  information  in the  data,  we  have  in- 
cluded  the  interwar  years  in  the  sample.  There  is  some  evidence  of 
heteroskedasticity  across  the  war  years,  for which  the  estimates  have 
been  corrected,  but little evidence  of parameter instability (a Chow  test 
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specify the equation with the logarithm, rather than the level of the unem- 
ployment  rate as the dependent  variable. Our estimated  equation is: 
A log u =  -0.847  +  0.369D  +  13.6ATY_,  +  0.738RR +  1.62MM 
(2.46)  (1.46)  (3.40)  (1.54)  (0.57) 
+  1.83UD  -  0.018IPD  +  0.322POP -  .1951ogu_l 
(1.94)  (1.72)  (1.10)  (2.49) 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
Sample period: 1923-38,  1948-87. 
Standard error 1923-38  =  0.198; Standard error 1948-87  = 0.171 
LM test for second-order  serial correlation: X2(2)  = 4.61 
where  D is a dummy  on  1923-38,  TY is the income  tax rate, RR is the 
replacement  ratio, MM is industrial mismatch,  UD is union  density, IPD 
is  the  incomes  policy  dummy,  POP is  the  proportion  of  the  working 
population  born after 1930, A is the difference  operator and all variables 
are defined  net of their 1955 values.  While most of the variables are not 
especially  significant,  which  is  unsurprising  given  the  limited  sample 
information,  in all cases  they  do  at least  have  the anticipated  signs.  A 
particularly notable feature is the high degree of persistence  embodied  in 
the equation  (further legs  are not significant). 
This  equation  contains  most  of  the  contending  explanations  for an 
increase in the natural rate, yet leaves much of the rise in unemployment 
in  1980 and  1981  unexplained,  for  there  are  two  very  large  positive 
residuals  in these  years  which  it seems  natural to identify  with  the  se- 
vere contraction  in the growth  of nominal  demand  discussed  in Section 
1.  Conditional  on  this  identifying  assumption  (which  should  give  an 
Table 4  CAUSES OF THE RISE IN UNEMPLOYMENT AFTER 1978 
(% POINTS) 
Due to:  1980  1982  1984  1986 
Dynamics  1.4  2.0  2.4  2.6 
Benefits  -0.5  -0.4  0.0  0.2 
Mismatch  0.1  0.5  0.7  0.7 
Working population  born after 1930  0.1  0.4  0.8  1.3 
Unions  -0.1  -0.9  -2.1  -3.6 
Incomes  policy  1.2  2.4  3.3  3.6 
Income taxes  -2.4  -1.7  -1.1  -0.7 
Demand  1.0  3.1  2.5  3.1 
Total  0.8  5.3  6.5  7.0 
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upper bound  on the effect of demand)  Table 4 gives  a breakdown  of the 
rise in  unemployment  after 1978 into  its  constituent  parts.  This is ob- 
tained  by  dynamic  simulation  of  the  estimated  equation,  setting  each 
independent  variable in turn to its 1978 level. 
The  picture  is  as  follows.  At  the  start of  1979 unemployment  was 
below  its underlying  long-run  natural rate ut, so unemployment  would 
have  shown  some  tendency  to rise in any case (see  the first row of the 
table). To this must be added  the effects of the demise  of incomes  policy 
as manifested  in the "Winter of Discontent."  These two factors together 
raise unemployment  by 45 percentage  points by 1982. On top of this is a 
further 3 percentage  points  coming  from the  demand  contraction.  The 
weakening  of the unions  since then has acted to reduce unemployment, 
but the persistence  mechanisms  have  ensured  that this beneficial effect 
has been offset by the continuing  effects of the demand  shock as well as 
the end of incomes  policy. In fact by 1986 the effect of incomes  policy and 
union  density  exactly  offset;  one  could  say the Iron Lady obtained  the 
same  effect  by  decimating  the  unions  as  Jim Callaghan  obtained  by 
collaborating with  them! 
Unfortunately  data for all the explanatory variables is not available for 
1988. However,  by 1987 the long-run employment  rate ut is some 3.5 per- 
centage  points  below the actual unemployment  rate. Consequently  even 
in the absence  of further beneficial  supply-side  developments,  or posi- 
tive  demand  shocks,  some  fall in  unemployment  in  1988 could  have 
been expected.  This may help  to explain events  in the last year. 
How  does  this  assessment  relate  to  other  studies?  Both  Bean  and 
Gavosto  (1989) and  Newell  and  Symons  (1988), using  rather different 
structural frameworks,  attribute around 3.5 percentage  points of the rise 
in unemployment  from the late Seventies  to the early Eighties to nominal 
demand  shocks.  Layard and Nickell (1986) attribute an even stronger role 
to demand; they calculate that virtually all of the rise in unemployment  is 
attributable to the demand  shock.  None  of these  studies  find an impor- 
tant role for benefits  or mismatch.  There is some comfort in the fact that 
these  studies  produce  similar results to the approach adopted  here. 
A  striking  feature  of  Table 4 is  the  persistence  of  the  effects  of  the 
demand  shock.  This persistence  seems  far too large to be attributed to 
the ordinary lags inherent  in the process  of matching workers to jobs: is 
it due to insider or outsider  mechanisms?  It is difficult to say much about 
this  from  time  series  evidence  on  one  country  alone.  Accordingly  we 
have examined  differences  in the degree  of persistence  across countries 
to see whether  they are better explained  by insider or outsider phenom- 
ena. Although  the insider mechanism  need not be confined  to unionised 
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nopoly  power-one  would  expect it to be more pronounced  in countries 
with  a high  level  of unionisation,  other things  being  equal.  Conversely 
where  replacement  ratios are high  and,  in particular, where  the period 
for which  benefits  are payable  is long,  the outsider  mechanism  should 
be relatively  strong. 
The basic  data  for this  exercise  is  drawn  from the  CLE-OECD data- 
bank,  augmented  by  data  on  benefit  levels  and  duration  drawn  from 
Emerson  (1986) and  OECD (1988). In the spirit of equation  (2), we  con- 
duct a panel  regression  of the  standardised  unemployment  rate on  its 
lagged  value,  where  union  density,  replacement  rates, benefit duration, 
and  the  Bruno-Sachs  1985 corporatism  ranking  are interacted  with  the 
lagged  unemployment  rate. To proxy  the long-run  natural rate in each 
country  we  incorporate  a  country  specific  constant,  as  well  as  union 
density  and  the  replacement  ratio which  exhibit  time  series  as well  as 
cross-section  variation.  We also include  a common  time trend to control 
for unmodelled  shifts  in the  natural rate (results  are similar if country 
specific  trends  are included  instead).  The  countries  in  the  sample  are 
Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Ire- 
land, Japan, the Netherlands,  Norway,  Spain, Sweden,  Switzerland,  the 
United  Kingdom,  and  the United  States.  The sample  period  runs from 
1961 to 1986. We obtain (omitting country constants): 
Au =  (0.0052CORP +  0.00054DUR  +  0.239RR -  0.263UD  -  0.151)u_l 
(2.01)  (5.60)  (2.82)  (3.41)  (6.53) 
+  0.313RR  +  1.59UD  +  0.031t 
(1.20)  (3.43)  (5.02) 
where  CORP is the Bruno-Sachs  corporatism ranking,  DUR is the num- 
ber of weeks  for which  benefits  are payable  (set  at 260 for benefits  of 
indefinite  duration),  and  the  other  variables  are as  defined  above.  t- 
statistics are in parentheses. 
The results  are striking.  Adjustment  is apparently  more rapid in cor- 
poratist  economies  (a low value  of CORP corresponds  to a highly  cor- 
poratist  economy),  but  controlling  for this,  high  unionisation  actually 
appears to speed up adjustment,  contrary to the insider thesis  (although 
higher unionisation  does  raise the level of the natural rate, as one would 
expect).  Per contra, the higher  the replacement  rate and,  especially,  the 
longer  the duration  of benefits,  the slower  is adjustment.  Raising dura- 
tion from 26 weeks  to two  years raises the coefficient  on lagged  unem- 
ployment  by 0.042,  which  for an "average" country raises the mean lag 
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that the primary source of unemployment  persistence  may come via the 
outsider rather than the insider effect. 
2.4 THE  VERDICT  ON UNEMPLOYMENT 
So is the  unemployment  record to be counted  on the  debit side  of the 
government's  ledger? Could it have done  better? Some would  argue for 
continued  efforts  to build  consensus  through  the  development  of cor- 
poratist  machinery,  aided  by  the  use  of  more  flexible  (tax-based?) in- 
comes  policy.  Supporting  a  cooperative  equilibrium  in  this  fashion 
would  in their opinion  have  been  preferable to the painful and divisive 
process  of breaking  down  power  groups.  A  successful  incomes  policy 
would  also  have  served  as  a  second  nominal  anchor  during  the 
disinflation  process. 
Whether  such  policies  could  have  worked  is open  to debate.  What is 
certain, however,  is that they were not on offer to the electorate in 1979, 
for it was difficult to see how  an increasingly  divided  Labour party could 
deliver  a pact with  the  unions  after the  disastrous  "Winter of Discon- 
tent."  Mrs.  Thatcher  declared,  "There Is No  Alternative,"  and  from a 
purely political perspective  she was probably right. 
3. PRODUCTIVITY 
3.1 AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
The  defeat  of  inflation  was  by  no  means  the  only  objective  of  the 
Thatcher  administration.  Tax cuts  to  reward  enterprise,  deregulation 
and privatisation  to promote  efficiency, and measures  to limit the influ- 
ence of trade unions  were supposed  to enhance  the supply  performance 
of the economy.  A low and stable rate of inflation would  simply provide 
the  right  macroeconomic  environment.  What  evidence  is  there  of im- 
proved  performance  on the supply  side? 
Table 5 presents  data on  the rate of growth  of labour productivity  in 
Table  5  PRODUCTIVITY  GROWTH  (GNP/GDP  PER  WORKER;  %  PER 
ANNUM) 
1967-73  1973-79  1979-83  1983-87 
United Kingdom  3.3  1.1  2.1  2.3 
United States  0.9  0.0  0.2  1.4 
France  4.4  1.3  1.6  2.1 
Germany  4.4  2.2  1.3  1.7 
Italy  4.9  1.7  1.0  2.5 
Japan  8.4  3.0  2.5  3.5 
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the UK and  its five  main  industrial  competitors.  Prior to 1973 Britain's 
productivity  growth  rate lagged  behind  all of them  except the U.S.  The 
second  half of the  Seventies  saw  a marked  slowdown  in all countries, 
but  Britain's  performance  since  1979 has  been  relatively  good,  being 
exceeded  only by that of Japan. 
Table 6 puts  these  growth  rates into perspective  by comparing  abso- 
lute productivity  levels  to those  of the U.S.  at various dates in the post- 
war era, using  the OECD's estimates  of 1980 purchasing  power parities. 
This  shows  that,  although  British productivity  prior to Mrs.  Thatcher 
had  been  improving  relative  to  the  U.S.,  performance  relative  to  the 
other  four  countries  had  been  poor.  The  picture  is broadly  consistent 
with the Gerschenkron  thesis; those countries that exhibited particularly 
rapid productivity  growth  during  the  postwar  period  were  also  those 
that lagged furthest behind.  France, Germany, Italy, and Japan all started 
the  postwar  era  with  severely  depleted  capital  stocks.  Consequently 
they  also  had  the  biggest  potential  for growth.  Why was  Britain over- 
taken by her European  partners? While the other countries appeared  to 
be  closing  in on  the  U.S.,  Britain seemed  to be  converging  to a lower 
level. 
The following  simple  "catch-up" regression  makes this point forcibly. 
The sample  is a panel  of the nineteen  countries  in the CLE-OECD data 
bank running  from 1950 to 1980, i.e.,  prior to Mrs. Thatcher. The depen- 
dent  variable  is  the  rate  of  growth  of  productivity  in  the  country  in 
question  relative  to  the  rate  of  growth  of  productivity  in  the  leading 
country  (ARP). This is related  to (the logarithm) of lagged  relative pro- 
ductivity (RP  _)  and a string of variables which might explain asymptotic 
differences  in productivity  levels.  These are (all measured  relative to the 
lead country): days  lost through  industrial  action per worker to control 
for the degree  of conflict between  labour and capital (STR); the propor- 
tion of the 20-24  age group in higher education  to control for differences 
in the level of human  capital (EDN); the share of taxes in total income to 
Table  6  RELATIVE  OUTPUT  PER  WORKER  (US=100, AT 1980 
PURCHASING  POWER  PARITIES) 
1951  1960  1970  1980 
United Kingdom  55.2  56.7  60.4  66.5 
France  38.9  48.2  63.9  80.7 
Germany  37.1  50.9  63.5  77.9 
Italy  34.1  57.9  67.9  79.4 
Japan  16.0  23.5  46.1  62.8 
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control for any  effect  on  the  effort levels  of both  workers  and  manag- 
ers  (TAX); and  union  density  as  a  proxy  for  union  power  (UD).  In 
addition,  for the  UK only,  there  is a constant  (D) to allow  for any  un- 
explained  difference  in  long-run  productivity  levels.  Note  that  phys- 
ical capital per worker  is not included  as a regressor.  Obviously  this is 
central  to  explaining  productivity  differences  in  the  short-run.  How- 
ever, in the long  run capital is endogenous  and,  assuming  perfect cap- 
ital  mobility  and  access  by  all  countries  to  an  identical  production 
technology,  differences  in capital per worker should  reflect cross-coun- 
try differences  in  total factor productivity  due  to variables  such  as tax 
rates and  skill levels.  The  estimated  equations  can thus  be thought  of 
as  simple  reduced  forms.  Estimation  by  SUR (for brevity,  diagnostics 
for  individual  countries  are  not  presented)  gives,  with  t-statistics  in 
parentheses: 
ARP =  -.0439RP_1  -  .0008STR +  .0353EDN  -  .0042TAX -  .0024UD  -  .0128D 
(9.86)  (0.33)  (4.48)  (2.92)  (0.58)  (7.33) 
Given the simplicity  of the model,  the results are suprisingly  sensible. 
Most of the variables enter as one would  expect; viz. higher taxes lower 
long-run relative productivity, an expansion  in higher education tends to 
raise relative  productivity  and  the  productivity  "gap" is  eliminated  at 
around 4% per annum.  The dummy  for the UK is highly  significant and 
implies an asymptotic  productivity  level some 30-35% below other coun- 
tries with  a similar structure.  This is despite  controlling  for some  of the 
most  frequently  cited  reasons  for  Britain's poor  relative  performance: 
high  taxes,  low  skills,  bad  industrial  relations,  and  excessive  union 
power.  Countries  such  as Sweden  have  high  tax rates and high  union 
density,  but  also  a high  relative  productivity  level.  What is  so  special 
about the United Kingdom? Any explanation for Britain's poor productiv- 
ity performance-and  its possible  reversal under  Mrs. Thatcher-must 
come to grips with  this peculiarity. With this as background let us there- 
fore turn to a closer examination  of recent experience. 
3.2 THE  PRODUCTIVITY  REBOUND 
The acceleration  in productivity  growth  is not  apparently  due  to a re- 
vival  in investment,  which  has  grown  strongly  only  very  recently, but 
rather to rapid total factor productivity  (TFP) growth.  We use a measure 
that caters both for labour hoarding  and imperfect competition  in prod- 
uct  markets.  Start  by  assuming  a  CRS  technology  of  the  form 
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augmenting  technical  progress  and  B is  capital-augmenting  technical 
progress.  Following  Hall (1986), TFP growth  (X) is given by: 
X  -  H -  ,LSNN  -  (1-  SN)K  =  /SNA,+(1-/,SN)B  (3) 
where  a caret denotes  a growth  rate, ,  is the ratio of price to marginal 
cost, and Si is the share of factor i. As a simple correction for the possibil- 
ity that observed  hours,  Ho, may exceed  effective  hours,  we employ  the 
correction suggested  by Muellbauer  (1986): 
h = hN +  (Ho-HN)/HN -  P HN/(Ho-HN) 
where  lower  case letters  denote  logarithms,  HN is a measure  of normal 
hours,  and  3 is a parameter  to be estimated.  Since the overtime  hours 
term  (Ho-HN)/HN is  procyclical,  this  last  term  should  also  control  for 
labour hoarding  along the heads  dimension. 
For each two-digit  industry,  over the period  1969-86,  we estimate  the 
regression: 
A[y-hn-(H-HN)IHN-k],  =  a  -  ,A[HN/(HO-HN)]t  +  ,i[SNA(n-k)]t  +  ut 
using  the rate of growth  of total domestic  output1 and the rate of growth 
of  world  output  as  instruments  for  the  endogenous  (labour-share- 
weighted)  capital-labour ratio. We then  use  the associated  estimates  to 
calculate a+ u.  We allow for shifts in the drift parameter, a, at the begin- 
ning of 1974 and again at the beginning  of 1980. 
For brevity  we  shall  not  report  the  full  regression  results  for each 
industry here. The mean estimates  of /t is 1.52. Most industries are fairly 
close  to  this,  although  the  individual  standard  errors are  sometimes 
quite large.  However,  there are a few  industries  which  produce  unrea- 
sonable  estimates  of /.  For this  reason  we  have  employed  a Bayesian 
estimator in which  the prior distribution  of ,u is normal with  a mean  of 
1.33 and a standard  deviation  of 0.5,  while  the prior distribution on the 
other  parameters  is  diffuse.  This  is  sufficient  to eliminate  any  a priori 
implausible  estimates  of /,  which  might otherwise  contaminate the esti- 
mates of TFP growth. 
1. Domestic  output will be correlated  with the equation  error  if economy-wide  productivity 
shocks  are  an important  source  of economic  fluctuations.  Under  the maintained  hypothe- 
sis that the rate of growth of world output is a valid instrument,  the hypothesis that 
domestic  output is uncorrelated  with the equation  error  can be tested with the aid of the 
usual Lagrange-Multiplier  instrument orthogonality test.  For only two  out of  the 
twenty-six  industries  is the x2  statistic  significant  at the 95%  level and for the twenty-six 
industries  taken together the test statistic  is 31.3, distributed  as X(26). 38 - BEAN  & SYMONS 
The associated  TFP growth  rates over key sub-periods  appear in Table 
7.  Two  points  are  worth  making.  First,  although  politicians  and  the 
media  began  to  draw  attention  to the  productivity  miracle only  in the 
mid-Eighties,  for  some  industries  the  revival  can be  dated  as early as 
1980. Industries  like  metal  manufacture  and  shipbuilding  are cases  in 
point. Second,  the productivity  revival is not confined to manufacturing, 
although  it is more pronounced  there. Construction,  distribution,  trans- 
port, banking,  and other services  all show  an acceleration. 
We have  also  calculated  a second  set of estimates  of TFP growth  for 
industries  in  the  manufacturing  sector.  These  are based  on  the  same 
methodology  except  that  they  use  different  capital stock  estimates.  A 
number  of authors  have  suggested  that the official capital stock figures 
may overstate  the rate of capital accumulation  during the second  half of 
Table  7  TOTAL  FACTOR  PRODUCTIVITY  GROWTH  BY  INDUSTRY  (PER 
CENT PER ANNUM) 
1969-73  1973-79  1979-82  1982-86 
Agriculture  3.2  0.5  7.5  2.8 
Coal  -0.9  -0.6  1.8  5.6 
Oil and natural  gas  22.6  71.8  -16.7  11.8 
Oil processing  -5.8  -4.1  -0.6  -0.7 
Electricity,  gas, and water  7.4  2.5  1.2  3.9 
Manufacturing  Industries: 
Metal  manufacture  2.4  3.0  13.9  6.0 
Other mineral products  6.6  1.5  2.0  4.2 
Chemicals  5.8  1.1  3.1  5.5 
Other metal products  1.2  -0.8  1.0  0.5 
Mechanical engineering  3.3  0.7  3.5  2.4 
Electrical engineering  7.8  3.8  5.9  6.5 
Motor vehicles  1.3  -0.9  6.6  4.4 
Ships and aircraft  5.7  -1.9  7.1  5.1 
Food  2.5  1.1  4.3  1.9 
Drink and tobacco  2.9  0.8  0.9  3.4 
Textiles  4.5  1.4  3.3  4.9 
Leather,  footwear, and clothing  3.9  4.9  3.4  7.3 
Timber  5.6  -1.4  0.2  -0.3 
Paper  4.0  1.7  3.3  2.6 
Rubber  4.2  3.6  4.0  7.9 
Construction  2.8  0.0  1.8  3.9 
Distribution  3.2  0.1  1.9  2.7 
Transport  6.5  1.3  2.8  4.1 
Communications  3.9  3.4  2.6  4.8 
Banking  0.6  0.4  2.2  2.7 
Other services  -2.6  -1.6  1.5  0.3 Ten Years  of Mrs. T - 39 
the  Seventies  and  the  early  Eighties  when  there  was  extensive  unre- 
corded scrapping following  the two oil price shocks.  Conversely, the rate 
of capital accumulation  during  the  mid-Eighties  is likely  to have  been 
understated  as  some  imputed  retirements  would  already  have  taken 
place. 
Quantifying  the  size  of  this  effect  is no  easy  matter, but  Wadhwani 
and Wall (1986), provide  an alternative time series from 1972 to 1982 for 
total manufacturing  using  a firm's historic cost accounts,  which suggests 
a  cumulative  overprediction  of  around  14% between  1974 and  1982. 
They provided  us with alternative estimates of the rate of capital accumu- 
lation from 1972 until 1982 by industry. These were then used in place of 
the  official  figures  for this  period  and  the  estimates  for after 1982 ad- 
justed upwards  to take account of the lower based. 
For brevity,  the  results  (available  on  request)  are not  reported  here. 
However,  the  (unweighted)  mean  annual  TFP growth  rates over 1973- 
79, 1979-82,  and  1982-86  are, respectively,  1.3%, 3.6%, and 4.0%. The 
corresponding  figures  for Table 7 are 1.2%, 4.2%, and 4.2%. Thus  the 
attenuation  in  the  estimated  acceleration  in TFP growth  is  really very 
modest.  Furthermore,  the correlation across industries  of the two differ- 
ent  measures  of  the  TFP acceleration  between  1969-79  and  1980-86  is 
also very high  at 0.95. This suggests  that explanations  for differences  in 
productivity  performance  across industries  may not depend  too critically 
on the choice  of measure.  However,  to be on the safe side the estimates 
reported below  employ  both measures. 
Finally,  technical  progress  both  before  and  after  1980 seems  to  be 
primarily labour-augmenting.  Suppose  that  in  industry  i, Ai =  A+A:, 
and Bi =  B+Bi, where  A and  B are the economy-wide  average levels  of 
labour and capital-augmenting  technical progress respectively.  Then (cf. 
equation  (3)): 
Xi =  (ALSN)A  +  (1 /-SN)iB  +  (LSN)Ai +  (1-  ,SN)Bi. 
Provided Ai and Bi are uncorrelated with (LSN)i,  consistent  estimates of A 
and B can be obtained  from a cross-section  regression  of TFP growth on 
(ASN) and  (1-,ESN).  Table 8 reports  the  results  of such  a regression  for 
mean  TFP growth  over  1969-79  and  1980-86  for the TFP measures.  In 
each case the estimate  of B is near zero and totally insignificant  suggest- 
ing that technical  progress  is indeed  labour-augmenting.  This suggests 
that in trying to understand  the sources  of the productivity  revival one 
should  focus  on factors likely to enhance  the efficiency  of labour rather 
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3.3 EXPLANATIONS  FOR  THE  PRODUCTIVITY  REBOUND 
Muellbauer (1986) cites five main hypotheses  for the acceleration in pro- 
ductivity  growth  after 1980. Two of these  have  already been  implicitly 
addressed  and dismissed:  the effects of labour hoarding and the mismea- 
surement  of capital due to early retirements.  The three other hypotheses 
are: 
(i)  A  Schumpeterian  "gale  of  innovation"  due  to  the  spread  of  the 
microchip and the introduction  of computerised  technology; 
(ii)  A  "batting-average"  effect  whereby  the  deep  recession  of 1980-81 
led to the closure  of the least efficient plants,  thus raising the aver- 
age productivity  of those  who  remained in business; 
(iii)  An improvement  in industrial relations as a result of the weakening 
of the union  movement. 
To these  three hypotheses  we  might add two others: 
(iv)  A "kick-in-the-pants" effect whereby  a tightening  of product market 
conditions  and increased  threat of takeover led to the elimination of 
managerial slack; 
(v)  Increased  effort  by  workers  and  managers  resulting  from cuts  in 
income  taxes. 
Three of these  explanations  have  in common  that the severity  of the 
1980-81  recession  was  itself  a primary cause  of the productivity  boom. 
The most  telling  way  to  test  this  hypothesis  is  to examine  the  conse- 
quences  of the even  greater recession  of 1929-31.  Between  1933 and 1936 
Table  8  TECHNICAL  PROGRESS  IS LABOUR-AUGMENTING 
Dependent  Variable  ISN  (1-piSN)  R2 
(1) Xl(1969-79)  0.0209  -0.0123  0.116 
(4.78)  (0.77) 
(2) X1(1980-86)  0.0387  -0.0076  0.243 
(9.73)  (0.05) 
(3)  X2(1969-79)  0.0250  0.084  0.028 
(7.49)  (0.73) 
(4)  X2(1980-86)  0.0375  -0.020  0.232 
(8.17)  (0.95) 
Notes:  White t-statistics in parentheses. 
Rows (1)  -  (2) use basic TFP measure. 
Rows (3) --  (4) use  alternative capital stock measure Ten  Years  of  Mrs. T *  41 
manufacturing  productivity  grew 4.7% per annum; some  1.7 percentage 
points  faster  than  it had  prior to  1929, but  over  1936-38  productivity 
actually  fell  slightly.  We  conclude  that  the  Great Depression  did  not 
deliver  a  productivity  breakthrough  in  Britain.  This  seems  to  hold  a 
fortiori for other countries  during the interwar period.  Finally and more 
recently, there are a number  of European economies  which  experienced 
deep recessions  in the Eighties, but did not experience a spurt in produc- 
tivity growth.  However,  while  there  seems  to be no necessary  link be- 
tween  deep  recessions  and  subsequent  rapid productivity  growth,  it is 
nevertheless  still possible  that any, or all, of the  five mechanisms  may 
have played  a role in Britain's productivity  revival. 
There may  be  something  to the  "gale of innovation"  explanation  al- 
though it is inevitably difficult to quantify. The New Earnings  Survey  shows 
that the relative wages  of computer  personnel  and those  in information 
technology  have risen more than most during the Thatcher years, which 
is at least consistent  with the "microchip" hypotheses.  On the other hand 
to the extent that such new  technology  is embodied  in capital one would 
expect its adoption  to be associated with a burst of investment,  yet invest- 
ment in plant and machinery  remained  very depressed  until 1984. To be 
sure, there are some industries where the adoption of new technology  has 
totally altered the character of production.  Yet often this technology  had 
been  available for some  time,  and it was  only a change  in the climate of 
industrial relations which  permitted its introduction.  The introduction of 
direct computerised  typesetting  and  the  consequent  elimination  of the 
"hot metal" printworkers in the newspaper  industry is a classic example. 
Finally one  would  surely  have  expected  such  a microchip-led  spurt of 
productivity  growth  to be a worldwide  phenomenon,  yet as the interna- 
tional  comparisons  made  clear, an acceleration  in productivity  growth 
during the Eighties is a primarily British phenomenon. 
The second  hypothesis,  the batting average-effect,  looks increasingly 
less plausible  as time passes.  This produces  a once-and-for-all change in 
the level  of productivity,  and should  thus have come to a halt after 1982 
as the economy  entered  the recovery  phase.  So it is difficult to explain 
the continued  rapid productivity  growth  of the last few  years with  this 
hypothesis.  Furthermore  Oulton  (1987) shows  that  while  the  level  of 
productivity  is in general  higher  in large plants,  the  1980-81  recession 
was associated  with a shift in employment  away from large plants. Conse- 
quently  there was,  if anything,  a reverse batting average-effect in which 
the high productivity  producers  were eliminated. 
Let us now  turn to the fourth hypothesis,  the kick-in-the-pants  effect. 
When  managerial  effort  cannot  be  accurately  monitored,  inefficiencies 
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bankruptcy or takeover is low. Governments  during the Sixties and Sev- 
enties  showed  themselves  willing  to finance the operating deficits of the 
nationalised  industries  and  to subsidise  declining  private firms and in- 
dustries.  Whatever  the  merits  of  this  from a social point  of view,  it is 
likely to have  reduced  pressure  on  managers.  Mrs. Thatcher's govern- 
ment slashed  industrial subsidies,  and set the nationalised  industries  the 
target of breaking  even  with  the ultimate  aim of returning  them  to the 
private  sector.  Furthermore  the  removal  of  exchange  controls  and  in- 
creasing  capital market integration  has  made  firms more open  to take- 
over than before. 
It is virtually  impossible  to quantify  the  importance  of this channel. 
Some rather weak  evidence  against its significance  is provided  by Table 
8,  for if improved  management  were  the  key,  then  one  might  expect 
capital productivity  as well as labour productivity  to have improved.  Yet 
the table suggests  that even  after 1979 most of the TFP growth  seems  to 
have been  labour-augmenting  in nature.  One  should  not push  this too 
far, however,  because  managerial  inefficiencies  might  well  be  mostly 
manifested  in the way  labour is deployed.  Furthermore, to some  extent 
increased  managerial  efficiency  is simply  the counterpart of the reduc- 
tion in union  power  that underlies  the "industrial relations" hypothesis. 
The tax-cut argument  must also hinge  on increased managerial effort, 
for the reduction in marginal tax rates at average earnings levels has been 
fairly modest,  even  to the present  (see Dilnot et al. 1987). By contrast the 
top rate of tax has been halved from 83% in 1979 to 40% today. As we shall 
see,  the before-tax incomes  of high earners have at the same time risen, 
which some have taken as an indication that effort is highly responsive  to 
marginal tax rates (Minford and Ashton  1988). However,  the findings  of 
Holland  (1977) suggest  that even  for managers  and the professions,  the 
responsiveness  of effort to changes  in taxes is negligible  (see also Dilnot 
and Kell 1988). Cuts in marginal tax rates at the upper end of the earnings 
distribution may have stimulated entrepreneurship-the  rate of new busi- 
ness  formation in 1987 was  some  40% higher than in 1979-but  that can 
scarcely have had a measurable  effect on the productivity  figures which 
are dominated  by firms that were already in existence  in 1979. 
Any  explanation  of the productivity  rebound  must therefore focus on 
the role of labour,  and  there is little doubt  that the third hypothesis,  a 
change  in the climate of industrial  relations,  is a strong candidate  (e.g., 
Metcalf 1988, and the many references therein; Layard and Nickell 1989). 
However,  there  is less  agreement  on  the precise  channel  and whether 
changes  in structure due  to legislation  or changes  in the economic  envi- 
ronment  should  take the credit. 
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in Section 2. It is easy to see that the recession  of 1980-81 is also likely to 
have reduced the relative bargaining strength of unions.  On one hand in- 
creased unemployment  raises the prospective  cost to the worker of layoff 
or redundancy.  On the other hand the ability of management  to meet high 
wage  demands  will have been limited by increased product market pres- 
sures arising from falling demand  generally  and in the tradeables sector 
by  the  appreciation  of  sterling.  The  difference,  of  course,  is  that  this 
weakening  in the  relative  position  of unions  would  not be expected  to 
persist  as  the  economy  recovered.  By contrast  the  reduction  in  union 
power wrought  by politico-legal  changes  might well be more permanent. 
3.4 MODELLING  THE  PRODUCTIVITY  REBOUND:  THE  IMPORTANCE  OF 
MULTI-UNIONISM 
While it is easy  to document  possible  reasons  for a reduction  in union 
power, it is, from a theoretical perspective,  less clear how this can explain 
events,  for as we  saw in Section 2.1.4.,  one would  expect a reduction in 
union power  to be associated  with a fall in own-product  wages.  Yet even 
the real wages  of unskilled  workers have been  rising in the last decade. 
The discussion  of Section  2.1.4  also  suggests  one  solution.  There we 
showed  that, in a unionised  economy,  the presence  of an incomes  policy 
would  result in lower unemployment,  real wages  and productivity  than 
would  be delivered  under  free collective  bargaining.  The demise  of the 
Social Contract during the "Winter of Discontent" in early 1979 signalled 
the end  of centralised  incomes  policies  and allowed  wage  bargainers to 
move  to  a  privately  efficient  point  involving  higher  productivity  and 
higher wages.  The difficulty with this thesis is that while it could help to 
explain  the  rapid  productivity  growth,  rising  real wages,  and  falling 
employment  observed  during 1980-82,  it is a little difficult to believe that 
the rapid productivity  growth  since  then  is simply  the consequence  of 
the unwinding  of incomes  policies.  Furthermore,  what  is involved  is a 
movement  along  a given  production  frontier, while  the  calculations  in 
Section  3.3  suggested  that what  is required is an outward  shift of that 
frontier  in  the  guise  of  labour-augmenting  technical  progress.2  So  it 
2. With  bargaining  over  wages and employment,  a change  in union  power,  or  the removal  of 
the constraints  imposed by incomes policies, would lead to a change  in ,i. If, however,  A 
is held constant as in the calculations  underlying  XI and X;, this would be interpreted 
instead as a change in TFP  growth. Measured  TFP  growth X is then given by: 
X=  X*  +  (/'-t)SN(N-K) 
where X* is true total factor productivity  growth and ,t'  is the new ratio of price to 
marginal  cost. If the capital-labour  ratio is rising at 3% per annum one would need 
(ui'-,)  -0.5  to produce  a spurious  acceleration  in TFP  growth  of one percentage  point. 
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seems  that an increase  in the efficiency  with which  labour is used  must 
be a central part of any explanation  of the productivity  rebound. 
The only  authors  that we  are aware of who  tackle this issue  seriously 
are Jackman, Layard,  and  Nickell  (1989, ch.  5).  They  suggest  that the 
Seventies  were  characterised  by bargaining over both wages  and effort. 
By contrast, in the Eighties they argue that the restoration of the right-to- 
manage  took  effort  out  of  the  province  of  negotiation.  In their model 
effort and  wages  are both  higher  in general  equilibrium when  effort is 
not  an object of the  bargain,  while  unemployment  is unchanged.  The 
problem with  this line of argument,  however,  is that it does  not explain 
why effort  should  have  ceased  to  be  an  object  of  negotiation  in  the 
Eighties,  since  from the point  of view  of the firm and the union,  it is in 
their  mutual  interest  to  negotiate  over  as  wide  a  set  of  variables  as 
possible.  Yet the argument  is important in focussing  on the importance 
of changes  in efficiency, because  the industrial relations evidence  quoted 
by Metcalf  (1988) suggests  that a major ingredient  of  the  productivity 
revival has been  an end  to overmanning,  demarcation,  and  similar re- 
strictive  practices.  The  theoretical  conundrum  is  to explain: first, how 
these could ever have been rational to begin with and second,  why other 
countries  with  similar,  or higher  unionisation  rates  were  not  equally 
affected. 
A  key  ingredient  is,  we  believe,  the  preponderance  of  multi-union 
firms and internecine  divisions  within  single  unions.  For historical rea- 
sons  much of the British trade union  movement  is organised  along craft 
rather than firm or industry lines.  Table 9, drawn from the 1984 Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey, reports the prevalence  of multi-unionism  for 
both  manual  and  non-manual  workers.  Furthermore it is  not  just  the 
Table  9  MULTI-UNIONISM  IN 1980  AND 1984  (ALL  ESTABLISHMENTS,  %) 
Manual  Non-Manual 
Workers  Workers 
1980  1984  1980  1984 
Number of unions 
1  65  65  43  39 
2 or more  35  35  57  61 
Number of bargaining  units 
1  77  82  57  61 
2 or more  20  18  42  37 
Unknown  2  1  1  2 
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prevalence  of multiple  bargaining  units  within  the firm that is notable. 
Shop  stewards  typically  have  a considerable  degree  of autonomy  (e.g., 
Flanagan, Soskice,  and Ulman  1983, p. 364). 
In our view  it is this unique  complexity  of British union  organisation 
that helps  to explain  the Thatcher productivity  "miracle." Independent 
of any extra transaction  costs  arising from the need  for management  to 
deal with a number of unions  or work force representatives,  agreements 
between  management  and one group of workers may create externalities 
for another  group.  In particular, in  isolation  a group  of  workers  may 
perceive  restrictive  practices  as  good  for the  employment  of its  mem- 
bers,  while  from  the  perspective  of  the  firm and  its  work  force  as  a 
whole,  they lower productivity  and discourage  employment. 
In an appendix  we  make this idea more precise in a model  that com- 
bines  elements  of  the  union  and  policy  coordination  literatures.  Typi- 
cally, although  for reasons  not well  understood,  unions  negotiate  over 
manning  levels  rather  than  employment  directly, which  is  left  to  the 
discretion of management  (see Oswald and Turnbull 1985). An overman- 
ning requirement has two effects on employment.  First, it raises employ- 
ment  directly  by  increasing  labour requirements  for given  output  and 
production  techniques;  second,  it raises the cost of labour in efficiency 
units leading  to a reduction  in the level of output and substitution  away 
from that sort of labour to other sorts of labour or more capital intensive 
forms of production.  The first effect dominates  if, and only if, the elastic- 
ity  of  demand  for  the  type  of  labour  governed  by  the  overmanning 
requirement  is less  than unity. 
When the work force is fragmented  into a number of bargaining units 
representing  labour types  that are not  close  substitutes  for each other, 
this  condition  is more  likely  to be  fulfilled.  If this  is the  case,  a union 
acting in isolation  will perceive  overmanning  arrangements  as a way  of 
protecting  jobs,  and  one  which  does  them  less  harm  than  lowering 
wages.  However,  this  results  in a fall in the marginal product  of other 
types  of labour, so reducing  the demand  for those  types  at given wages 
and with  given  manning  arrangements.  The result is an inefficient equi- 
librium with low wages  and low  productivity. 
How  does  this  help  to  explain  the  productivity  "miracle"? If  the 
unions  acted as one,  this would  internalise  the externalities imposed  on 
other  types  of  labour  by  overmanning  requirements;  indeed  in  the 
model  of  the  appendix,  the  coordinated  equilibrium  involves  no 
overmanning  whatsoever.  However,  this  is  not what  we  believe  has 
happened,  for as  Table 9 shows,  the  extent  of  multi-unionism  hardly 
changed  between  1980 and  1984.  (There has  been  a growth  in  single 
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not been a major change  in the underlying  structure. However,  a reduc- 
tion in union  power,  whether  wrought  by the recession  or legislation, 
has the effect of reducing  the degree of overmanning  and thus shifts the 
non-cooperative  equilibrium  toward the  cooperative  one.  Furthermore, 
in general equilibrium it turns out that the resulting increase in efficiency 
and  productivity  is  actually  associated  with  an  increase in  real wages 
(provided  some  conditions  on  tastes  and  technology  are satisfied),  de- 
spite the fall in union  power. 
3.5 EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE 
The thesis  developed  above suggests  that productivity gains are likely to 
have  been  greatest  in firms with  multiple  bargaining  units,  and where 
there is scope  for individual  shop  stewards  to defend  sectional interests 
even  where  there  is only  one  union.  Direct information  on  the preva- 
lence  of multiple  bargaining  units  can be extracted from the  Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey. However,  this does  not cover the second  as- 
pect,  the  degree  of  shop  steward  independence  within  single  unions. 
Since job diversity  is likely to be greater in large plants,  one would  also 
expect the acceleration in TFP growth  to have been most pronounced  in 
large  plants.  Furthermore,  as  noted  by  Millward  and  Stevens  (1986), 
there is a very  strong  relationship  between  establishment  size  and  the 
prevalence  of multiple  bargaining units.  Eighty-five percent of establish- 
ments  with  fewer  than a hundred  employees  were  covered  by a single 
bargaining  unit,  while  for establishments  with  a thousand  or more em- 
ployees  the  proportion  is only  46%. Given  the limited  degrees  of free- 
dom available we therefore choose  to use a measure of average plant size 
as a single control for both the presence  of multiple bargaining units and 
the degree  of individual  steward  autonomy  in our empirical work. 
Table 10 reports  the results  of tests  of the hypothesis  that the differ- 
ences in TFP growth  across industries  are correlated with plant size. The 
regressand  is the change3 in average  TFP growth between  1974-79  and 
1980-86  for each  of  the  two-digit  manufacturing  industries  in Table 7 
(some of the regressors  are not available outside  manufacturing); results 
are reported  for both  the TFP measures.  The independent  variables are 
3. In its basic form the model predicts that uncoordinated  bargaining with multiple bargain- 
ing units  should  reduce  the level of productivity  below  what would  be achieved  with a 
single union.  This suggests  that the dependent  variable should be the level of the rate of 
TFP growth  between,  say,  1979 and  1986,  rather than  the  change  in  the  rate of TFP 
growth.  In fact when  the rate of TFP growth  1974-79 is included as a regressor, it attracts 
a small  coefficient  of around  -0.1  and  is  invariably insignificant,  suggesting  that the 
difference  formulation  is indeed  appropriate.  The most  likely interpretation  is that the 
presence  of lagged  TFP growth  controls for inter-industry differences in TFP growth not 
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the  share  of  employment  in  the  industry  accounted  for by  establish- 
ments  of more  than  five  hundred  employees  (our plant  size  variable), 
the proportion  of manual workers in the industry covered by a collective 
agreement,  and a demand  shock variable. 
We have  employed  two  proxies  for the  last variable.  The first is the 
percentage  fall in employment  in  the  industry  between  1979 and  1982 
(measured as a negative  number).  Metcalf (1988) and Layard and Nickell 
(1989) both employ  this variable in their investigations  of the productiv- 
ity revival. Metcalf interprets this as a "fear factor"-which  could be the 
result  of  a weakening  of unions  as  well  as  tightening  product  market 
conditions.  Layard and Nickell,  however,  associate this specifically with 
the impact of the 1980-81  recession.  This is problematic if the increase in 
productivity  was  the result  of the legislation  to weaken  unions.  This is 
not adequately  controlled  for in the rest of the equation.  In that case the 
coefficient  on the employment  shock variable will be biased downward, 
leading  one  to overestimate  the importance  of the recession  in generat- 
ing the productivity  revival. We have therefore also used  the percentage 
fall in  output  in  the  industry  over  the  same  period  as  an  alternative 
demand  shock  variable.  Since  this  variable will,  if anything,  be  posi- 
tively correlated with the equation error it should  enable us to bound the 
effect of the recession.  The top half of Table 10 reports results using  the 
employment  fall as  an  explanatory  variable,  while  the bottom  half re- 
ports results using  the output  fall. 
Despite  the  small sample  size,  the results  are surprisingly  good.  The 
Table  10  SOURCES  OF ACCELERATION  IN TFP  GROWTH,  1980-86 ON 
1973-79 
Dependent  Collective  Proportion  of 
Variable  Constant  Agreement  Shakeout  Large  Firms  R2 
(1)  AXk  -0.0762  0.0840  -0.0802  0.0567  0.72 
(1.97)  (1.48)  (2.43)  (2.98) 
(2)  AX2  -0.0810  0.0829  -0.1113  0.0439  0.81 
(2.79)  (1.95)  (4.50)  (3.08) 
(3) AX1  -0.0724  0.0889  -0.0499  0.0628  0.66 
(1.68)  (1.40)  (1.60)  (2.74) 
(4)  AX2  -0.0761  0.0861  -0.0806  0.0559  0.71 
(2.15)  (1.66)  (3.16)  (2.98) 
Note:  Rows  1-2  use  the percentage  fall in employment  between  1979 and 1982 as the demand  shock 
variable.  Rows 3-4 use the percentage  fall  in output  between 1979  and 1982  as the demand  shock 
variable. 
Rows 1 and 3 use the basic  TFP  measure. 
Rows 2 and 4 use the alternative  capital  stock  measure. 48 *  BEAN  & SYMONS 
equations  explain  a high  degree  of  the  cross-section  variation  in  total 
TFP growth  rates,  and in all four regressions  the explanatory  variables 
have  the  anticipated  signs  and,  in  the  case  of the  shock  and  firm size 
variables are usually  highly  significant.  The shock variable remains im- 
portant even  when  the output  rather than the employment  fall is used. 
Furthermore, when  the first two regressions  are estimated by Instrumen- 
tal Variables using  the  output  fall as an instrument  for the  potentially 
endogenous  employment  fall, the point estimates  of the coefficients  are 
virtually identical.  This suggests  that the employment  fall is not picking 
up any effect from anti-union  legislation. 
Focussing  attention  on the final set of estimates,  we see that a 10% fall 
in output  between  1979 and  1982 was  associated  with  a 0.8 percentage 
point increase in TFP growth,  while firms with more than 500 employees 
on average  experienced  a 0.6 percentage  point  increase in TFP growth. 
Finally a 10% increase in union coverage is associated with a 0.9 percent- 
age point increase  in TFP growth.  These  results are certainly consistent 
with our basic hypothesis. 
How  do these  results  compare  with  other studies?  Both Metcalf, and 
Layard and Nickell using  three-digit industry level data find the employ- 
ment  shock  significant,  although  neither find any relationship  between 
productivity  growth and unionisation.4  Layard and Nickell do, however, 
report evidence  from a panel  of firms which  suggests  that unionisation 
matters.  Neither  Metcalf nor Layard and Nickell  include  a variable like 
plant size so their results  do not shed  light on the particular hypothesis 
under investigation  here. 
There  are,  however,  a wealth  of  studies  investigating  Britain's rela- 
tively  poor  productivity  performance  prior to  the  Thatcher revolution 
which do shed light on the industrial relations explanation of the produc- 
tivity miracle. Davies  and Caves  (1987) compare productivity  in UK and 
U.S. three-digit  manufacturing  industries  in 1967-68 and 1977, and find 
that  relative  productivity  performance  is  often  especially  bad  in  large 
plants,  which  they ascribe to either poor industrial relations or bad man- 
agement.  Pratten (1976) finds that of the 27% productivity  differential in 
1972 between  German  and  UK plants  of  the  same  international  com- 
pany,  some  12 percentage  points  are  directly  attributed  to  restrictive 
practices,  overmanning,  and  industrial  disputes.  (Since these  will  also 
discourage  capital formation the total effect on productivity will be even 
greater.) Finally a major study by Prais (1981) of ten industries during the 
4. Metcalf  uses the level rather  than the change in productivity  growth  over 1980-85  as the 
dependent variable.  This greatly  weakens the effect of the union variables  by failing  to 
control for underlying differences in productivity  growth rates across industries (see 
footnote 3). Layard  and Nickell's  results, however, do not suffer  from  this problem. Ten  Years  of Mrs. T *  49 
Sixties and  Seventies  found  that overmanning  and  restrictive practices 
were  a major constraint  in six of them  and  that large plants  especially 
suffered from industrial relations difficulties.  However,  Prais also found 
that in the other four industries,  inadequate  training and skills were the 
chief factor retarding productivity,  which  has important implications  for 
the sustainability  of the productivity  revival. 
3.6 CAN THE  PRODUCTIVITY  MIRACLE  CONTINUE? 
Our estimates  in Section 3.1 suggested  that prior to the election  of Mrs. 
Thatcher, the UK was converging  to a level of productivity some 30-35% 
below  its  main  industrial  partners.  It may  be  that  Britain has  at  last 
turned  the corner and  begun  to eliminate  that differential,  holding  out 
the prospect  of continued  rapid productivity  growth  and rising real in- 
comes  for some  time to come.  Such an optimistic  assessment  is prema- 
ture, however. 
To begin with it is not obvious  how  durable are the productivity  gains 
of the last few  years.  To the extent  that the decline  in union  power  is a 
cyclical  phenomenon  reflecting  high  levels  of  unemployment,  rather 
than  the  result  of  legislative  changes,  economic  growth  and  declining 
unemployment  may put a halt to the continued  elimination  of overman- 
ning.  Indeed  the  simple  one-shot  game  in the  appendix  suggests  that 
the productivity  gains of the last few years might even be reversed as the 
uncoordinated  equilibrium starts to shift away from the cooperative equi- 
librium. We think this is unlikely, for once workers have experienced  the 
higher  income  generated  by a more efficient,  productive  economy  they 
are unlikely  to want to revert to the status quo ante, and it may be easier 
to maintain an already established  equilibrium necessitating  a degree  of 
cooperation  than to establish  a cooperative  equilibrium in the first place. 
But the  new  equilibrium  may  be  fragile,  and  it may  prove  difficult  to 
coordinate  further  moves  toward  a fully  efficient  equilibrium  without 
changes  in  organisational  structure.  Yet as  noted  above  the  extent  of 
multi-unionism  has  changed  little.  Except  for  the  legislative  changes 
embodied  in the Employment  Acts,  there does  not appear to have been 
any  marked  changes  in underlying  structure which  are likely  to foster 
continued  erosion  of the  productivity  differential between  the UK and 
its competitors. 
Second,  even  if this assessment  is too pessimistic,  the studies  by Prais 
(1981), Daly, Hitchens,  and  Wagner (1985), and Steedman  and Wagner 
(1987) suggest  that a lack of technical skills is increasingly important as a 
factor  leading  to  poor  relative  productivity  performance.  Steedman 
(1987) and  Prais and  Wagner  (1988) elaborate  on  this  and  show  that, 
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els of British workers  and their French and German counterparts  seems 
to be widening  rather than  closing.  At the  end  of the  day, even  if the 
productivity  revival  does  not  run  out  of  steam  on  its  own,  a lack of 
human  capital is very likely to bring it to a halt. 
4. Income  Distribution 
While there may have  been  real gains  under  the Thatcher regime,  they 
have  so  far not  been  shared  widely,  for the  Thatcher years  have  coin- 
cided with a remarkable widening  of the income  distribution in the UK, 
reversing  a long-established  trend.  This is true not only after taxes, but 
also of raw pre-tax earnings,  which  is rather more surprising.  This wid- 
ening  occurred both within  and between  occupations.  Perhaps the most 
significant divergence  was between  white  and blue collar workers (Table 
11, row 1), but there has been  an important increase in earnings disper- 
sion  within  each  grouping  as shown  by the last four rows  of Table 11. 
Who in particular prospered?  Within the non-manual  occupation,  the 
New Earnings Survey shows  a  very  striking  increase  by  business  and 
administration  professionals  (some  22 relative points  between  1979 and 
1988). Within this broad category  the most  successful  occupations  have 
been  finance  specialists,  managers  and executives,  and accountants-in 
general those  concerned  with the running of private business.  But all the 
higher-status  non-manual  occupations  showed  increases in both relative 
earnings and employment. 
The increase in dispersion  is quite general throughout  all occupations 
except  for  government  employees.  There  also  seems  to  be  a positive 
correlation across occupations  between  growth  of relative earnings  and 
the  dispersion  of  earnings  within  the  occupation.  However  earnings 
dispersion  increased  absolutely  even  for  manual  workers,  for whom 
both relative earnings  and employment  fell. 
Table  11  CHANGES  IN THE  DISTRIBUTION  OF EARNINGS 
1969  1979  1988 
Non-manual  males relative to manual males  1.34  1.22  1.43 
Upper decile as proportiona  of median, manual  males  1.47  1.39  1.48 
Lower decile as proportiona of median,  manual males  0.73  0.73  0.69 
Upper decile as proportion  of median  non-manual  males  1.91  1.69  1.80 
Lower  decile as proportion  of median non-manual  males  0.61  0.63  0.58 
Note: (a) Refers to straight-time  earnings.  Other rows employ  weekly  earnings. 
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An obvious  question  is whether  this increase in the dispersion  of pre- 
tax earnings  is part of a global phenomenon,  or whether  it is peculiar to 
the  UK, and  hence  possibly  a consequence  of government  policy.  The 
paper by Frank Levy in this volume  shows  a remarkably similar widen- 
ing,  for instance,  of  the  earnings  distribution  in  the  U.S.  during  the 
Eighties. While there are some similarities with behaviour in other indus- 
trialised countries,  it is clear that Britain is something  of an outlier. Thus 
the OECD (1987) concludes  that whereas  the manual/non-manual  differ- 
ential narrowed  by around  5-10%  in most  OECD countries  during  the 
Seventies  (with  the  notable  exception  of Germany  where  the  opposite 
occurred),  since then it has been mostly  static or else risen only slightly. 
The  size  of  the  British increase  is  clearly quite  exceptional.  These  re- 
marks apply  equally  well  to managerial  staff in particular (OECD, op. 
cit., chart 3.3). While time series data on the dispersion  of manual wages 
is not readily available across countries,  the skilled/unskilled  differential 
for manual workers  displays  a similar pattern, with only the UK among 
the  European  countries  showing  a very  pronounced  widening  in  the 
Eighties (OECD, op.  cit., chart 3.4). 
So what has caused  this increase in earnings dispersion? One possibil- 
ity is the  operation  of a strong  substitution  effect toward  increased  la- 
bour  supply  resulting  from  reductions  in  income  taxes.  One  of  Mrs. 
Thatcher's  first acts  was  to  reduce  drastically  the  top  rates  of  income 
taxes, and this has been followed  in recent years by cuts in the basic rate 
(down  to  25% from  33% in  1979).  Despite  this,  personal  income  tax 
receipts  have  actually  increased  from  17.4% of GDP in  1979 to  18% in 
1987, which  might  look  like  evidence  of a movement  down  the ineffi- 
cient part of a Laffer curve.  Given the concentration of the tax cuts at the 
top  end  of  the  income  distribution,  one  would  expect  to  see  greater 
increases in labour supply  at the top end and therefore an increase in the 
spread of weekly  earnings.  However,  if all that is involved  is an increase 
in the  supply  of hours  one  would  also expect  to see  a narrowing  of the 
dispersion  of  hourly  wages.  The  second  and  third  rows  of  Table 11 
relating to movements  within  manual occupations  employ  hourly wage 
rates and thus  contradict the hypothesis.  Information on hours worked 
for non-manuals  is not available (and indeed  it is not clear that it would 
be meaningful  for many  occupations  if it were),  so it is possible  that the 
behaviour  of  differentials  within  non-manuals,  as  well  as  the  non- 
manual/manual  differential  (which  also uses  weekly  earnings for manu- 
als), is simply  a consequence  of changes  in relative hours.  On the whole 
we think this is unlikely, however.  It is possible  that the behaviour of all 
the  differentials,  including  those  within  the manual  group,  reflects in- 
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out in Section 3.3, increased  effort at higher incomes  is unlikely to be the 
explanation.  The available evidence  just does not suggest  that the elastic- 
ity of  the  supply  of  effort is  sufficiently  large for the  relevant  groups. 
Having  said that,  we  should  note  that striking similarity with  the U.S., 
which  has  also  experienced  a reduction  in the  progressivity  of the  tax 
system.  Were  the  same  phenomenon  to  happen  in  other  tax-cutting 
countries  (Sweden?)  then  one  would  be led to put more weight  on this 
explanation.  As  the  Ian Fleming  character Auric Goldfinger  remarked, 
"Once is happenstance,  twice is coincidence,  but three times,  Mr. Bond, 
is enemy  action." 
We believe  rather that two  other factors have been  in operation.  The 
first is the unwinding  of the incomes  policy. As we  noted  in Section 2, 
incomes  policies  were  in operation  for around 60% of the time between 
1961 and 1979. Many of these  policies were of the fixed sum, rather than 
fixed percentage,  variety and thus automatically gave higher percentage 
increases  to lower  paid workers  (such provisions  were often essential  in 
gaining TUC assent).  Consequently,  the narrowing of earnings differen- 
tials prior to  1979 is  hardly  surprising.  Furthermore,  the  OECD (1987) 
attribute much  of the narrowing  that occurred in other European coun- 
tries over this period  to the operation  of incomes  policies. 
The second  factor is a by-product  of our explanation  of the productiv- 
ity rebound.  We attributed  much  of this to the ending  of overmanning 
and restrictive practices.  This not only raises the efficiency of the labour 
directly  concerned,  but  will  also  raise  the  marginal  product  of  other 
factors (provided  they  are cooperant).  Consequently  one  would  expect 
to see  the  earnings  of capital,  managers,  skilled workers,  and  so forth 
also rising.  In the  appendix  we  show  that a reduction  in union  power 
which  leads  to the end  of overmanning  not only raises the wages  of the 
unionised  workers in general equilibrium,  but is also likely to lead to an 
increase in the relative wages  of other sorts of labour, i.e.,  the latter are 
the major beneficiaries  of the elimination  of inefficient practices. 
Given  the  increased  participation  of  married  women  in  the  labour 
force, it is perhaps  more useful  to focus on what is happening  to house- 
holds  rather than individuals  when  it comes  to considering  the welfare 
implications  of developments  in the income  distribution.  Table 12 com- 
pares the household  income  distribution  before and after the operation 
of the  tax and  benefit  system.  Final incomes  are now  significantly  less 
equal  than  before  Mrs.  Thatcher  took  office  in  1979: it is as if the  top 
quintile of households  has imposed  a tithe of 1% of the national cake on 
each  of  the  lower  quintiles.  The  Gini coefficient  for final incomes  has 
risen from 32% to 36%. Paradoxically, because  of bracket-drift, the high- 
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original  income  than  in  1979: final  household  income  is  now  82% of 
original income  as against  84% in 1979. Looked at from a different per- 
spective,  the  tax and benefit  system  has  transformed  a seven  point  in- 
crease in the Gini coefficient  for original incomes  between  1979 and 1986 
into a four point increase in the coefficient for final incomes. 
So much  for household  shares;  what  of spending  power?  Adjusting 
the shares  in Table 12 for changes  in real GDP and household  size,  we 
find that real final income  per head grew between  1979 and 1986 by 24%, 
11%, and  10% for the  top  three  quintiles.  However  for the  lower  two 
quintiles  real income  actually fell by 4% and 12% respectively.  Now  this 
increase  in income  inequality  need  not indicate  that lifetime  inequality 
has  increased,  for what  matters  is  permanent  rather than  current in- 
come.  It is  possible  that  the  increased  inequality  in  Table 12 merely 
reflects the fact that unemployment  is presently  at a high level,  or that 
the variability of (household)  earnings  over the life cycle has increased. 
We can examine  this hypothesis  by looking  at consumption  rather than 
income,  since this should  be related to expectations  of lifetime earnings. 
Looking  therefore  at  the  distribution  of  real  household  expenditure 
rather than income  (using the Family Expenditure  Survey) we find that the 
lowest  decile and quartile grew by only 3% and 6% respectively  between 
Table  12  DISTRIBUTION  OF ORIGINAL  AND FINAL  INCOME 
1975  1979  1986 
Original  Income 
Quintile Group 
Bottom  0.8  0.5  0.3 
2nd  10  9  6 
3rd  19  19  16 
4th  26  27  27 
Top  44  45  51 
Gini Coefficient  43  45  52 
Final  Income 
Quintile Group 
Bottom  7.1  7.1  6.3 
2nd  13  12  11 
3rd  18  18  17 
4th  24  24  24 
Top  38  38  42 
Gini coefficient  31  32  36 
Note: "Final Income"  includes  such  benefits  in  kind  as  the  National  Health  Service  and  the  state 
education  system. 
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1979 and 1986. For the lowest  decile,  real expenditure  fell by 9% for one- 
adult  households,  and  by  6% for  single-pensioner  households.  Poor 
families with  children  suffered  particularly: real expenditure  for single- 
adult households  with  children  fell by 16% at the lowest  decile  (and by 
23% at the lowest  quartile). Real expenditure  for the standard one man, 
one woman,  two children-household  fell by 4% at the lowest  decile. Not 
everyone  has prospered  in Mrs. Thatcher's Britain. 
5. Conclusions 
There  are  many  aspects  of  the  Thatcher  revolution  we  have  left  un- 
touched,  but  most  of  the  important  macroeconomic  events  of the  last 
decade  can in our view  be traced to the fundamental  switch  away from 
neo-corporatist  solutions  to  Britain's  economic  problems.  Has  Mrs. 
Thatcher been a Pareto-improvement?  The verdict must depend  on what 
would  have  happened  without  her.  Some  would  argue that successful 
corporatist policies  would  have allowed  a lower unemployment  rate and 
a more painless  disinflationary  process.  Under such policies  the income 
distribution  would  almost  certainly not have widened  in the way it has. 
Whether  they  would  have  also  led  to  the  productivity  revival is more 
debatable. 
Supporters  of the  government  argue-with  good  reason-that  these 
policies  had  been  tried and  found  wanting.  The basic structure of the 
British economy  was  simply  not  conducive  to Scandinavian-style  solu- 
tions.  There really was  no  alternative.  If the  successes  of the Thatcher 
years-the  reduction  in inflation  and  improvement  in productivity  are 
continued  into  the  foreseeable  future,  then  the  costs  in  terms  of  the 
increased  unemployment  and  poverty  of the last decade  will  probably 
turn out to be worthwhile.  If the productivity  revival comes to a halt and 
unemployment  remains  high,  then the issue  is less clear cut. 
Appendix:  A Model  with  Multiple  Unions 
The demand curve facing the firm is given by P= 8Y-e, where notation is as 
in Section 2.1.4 unless  otherwise  specified and firm subscripts are omitted 
for brevity. Two types  of labour, each with their own  union,  are used  to 
produce  output  via  a well-behaved,  CRS technology  Y=F(A,N,,A2N2), 
where  Ni is employment  of type  i labour, and  Ai represents  an  "over- 
manning" coefficient  that is the subject of bargaining (O<Ai<1). The idea 
is  that management  and  union  can  negotiate  to have  more  men  on  a 
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the utilitarian form N,V(Wi)+(Mi-N,)V,  where Mi is the total membership 
of each union,  and for simplicity  V(W) =  Wy. 
The key  assumptions  are that  while  bargaining  can  take place  over 
wages  and manning  levels,  bargaining  over employment  directly is not 
feasible,  and  that  there  is  no  layoff  pay.  Together  these  ensure  that, 
under  some  circumstances,  it  may  be  optimal  to  negotiate  manning 
agreements  involving  the employment  of totally surplus labour. 
The profit maximising  employment  levels,  for given  Ai, Wi, then  sat- 
isfy the usual marginal productivity  conditions 
dF 
-Fi  =  Wi/A,P(1-E)  (i=1,2)  (Al) 
dNi 
Straightforward algebra establishes  that: 
aniw,  =  -[Si+(l-Si)re]/E  =  -7i,  say  (A2a) 
ani/ai  =  7i-1  (A2b) 
n,aaj =  -8n,/awj  =  Sj(l-Co)/I  =  (p/,  say  (i#j)  (A2c) 
where  Si=FiNIF  is the "competitive  share" of labour type i, c=F1F2/Fl2F is 
the  elasticity  of substitution,  and  lower-case  letters denote  logarithms. 
Management  negotiates  with each union in turn over wages  and man- 
ning  treating the outcome  of the other bargain as given.  Along  a union 
indifference  curve we know  that, for union  i: 
da/dw, =  [WV,'/(V,-Vi)-  ,i]/(l  -,)  =  1 +  [yV,/(V,-V)-l]/(l-7i)  (A3) 
and hence 
d2a,/dw,2  =  yV,'V,/(V,-Vi)2(,q-l)  < 0 as (77-1)  > 0.  (A4) 
Management  is indifferent  between  any combination of wages  and man- 
ning  levels  that leaves  the  efficiency  cost  of labour,  Wi/A, unchanged. 
Hence  the firm's isoprofit lines have dai/dwi=l. 
There are two  possible  scenarios  depending  on whether  71i>. A low 
elasticity  of  labour  demand  (7/i<l)  is  the  only  case  where  an  interior 
solution  with  overmanning  can exist.  The contract curve then  satisfies: 
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which  is independent  of the manning  level.  Shifts in bargaining power, 
for given  V1, affect only  manning  arrangements  and not the wage.  This 
is,  of  course,  an  artifact of  the  particular specification  of  preferences. 
With a high elasticity of labour demand  (7ri>l), equation (A5) constitutes 
a  set  of  minima  rather  than  maxima.  It follows  that  the  equilibrium 
outcome  of the bargain must then involve  no overmanning. 
In order to examine  both  the partial equilibrium within  the firm, and 
the general  equilibrium  in the whole  economy,  it is helpful  to choose  a 
particular bargaining  solution.  For instance  suppose  wages  solve  a gen- 
eralised Nash  bargain, where  MiVi is the status quo point for the union: 
Max [V(Wi)- Vi]  Ni[SF(A,N1,A2N2)l  -  W1N -  W2N2]  (A6) 
for  i=1,2.  Then  for  an  interior  solution,  the  bargaining  outcome  is 
characterised  by  the  contract  curve  (A5) and  the  division  of  the  rents 
condition: 
38yV/(Vi- V)  -  3ri -  w,Ni/H=  0.  (A7) 
For a boundary  solution  with  Ai= 1 only the latter condition  is required. 
Henceforth  focus  on  the  case  where  7,i<1 and  there  is  an  interior 
solution  with  overmanning.  We know  that  for given  VI, the  wage  is 
determined  by  (A5) independently  of  manning  levels.  Hence  the  best 
response  of  each  bargaining  unit  to  the  manning  level  chosen  by  the 
other bargaining  unit is given  by: 
W,Ni = 13(1-rl,)[8F(A1N1,A2N2)1-  -  WTN1  - W2N2]  (A8) 
where  the  bars  are  added  to  emphasise  that  the  negotiated  wage  is 
independent  of the manning  level.  Consequently  along  the optimal re- 
sponse  for bargaining  unit 1 we have: 
da1lda2  =  -j3W2N2/(1  +3)WiN1  +  pl/(l+3)(1-i1)  (A9) 
and  similarly  for bargaining  unit  2,  mutatis  mutandis.  The  sign  of the 
right-hand  side  of  this  equation  depends  on  the  particular parameter 
values,  but the important  thing is that a reduction in union  power  (or a 
negative  demand  shock)  shifts  the response  function  in the direction of 
reduced overmanning.  Specifically suppose  that the production function 
is  symmetric  (in  the  sense  that  F(N1,N2)=F(N2,N1))  and  both  sorts  of 
labour face the same  outside  opportunities.  Then,  for i=1,2,  we have in 
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dal/d, =  -1/232(1-7)  <  0  (AlOa) 
dald8 =  -[l+2j3(1-q)]/2/38(l-7)  <  0  (AlOb) 
where  7=  71=  2 is the common  labour demand  elasticity. 
It may  seem  that  although  the  model  can  explain  the  productivity 
rebound,  it cannot  simultaneously  explain  the increase in wages.  How- 
ever, it must be remembered  that, in general,  equilibrium Vi is endoge- 
nous.  Assuming  type  i labour receives  the  same  wage  in all firms and 
that  i= (1-  ui)V(W) + uiV(B)  where  ui is the unemployment  rate for type i 
labour, we know  from (A5) that: 
u  =  y/(l-p,i)  (All) 
where Hi is the replacement  ratio for type i labour. A natural benchmark 
is  when  this  is  fixed,  e.g.,  because  benefits  are indexed  to  earnings. 
Changes  in relative  bargaining  strength  then  have  no  effect  on  unem- 
ployment  and only affect wages  and productivity. For a common  reduc- 
tion in relative bargaining  strength  across all firms we obtain: 
dwld/3 =  /8ald =  1[(1-E)-2P3(1--7)]  (A12) 
Hence  a reduction  in union  power  leads  to a rise in wages  and produc- 
tivity if and  only  if 213E(1--7)>(1-E).  Furthermore,  for this benchmark 
case,  productivity  improvements  are fully  reflected  in  real wages,  in 
contrast to the partial equilibrium result. 
Now  suppose  that instead  of bargaining independently  with manage- 
ment,  the two unions  got together  and bargained over wages  and man- 
ning levels  simultaneously.  To keep things  simple assume  again that the 
production  function  is symmetric and that the "superunion" weights  the 
welfare  of the two  types  of labour equally. This symmetry  ensures  that 
we  need  only  consider  symmetric  solutions  with  W1=W2=W  and 
Ai=A2=A.  In that case the superunion's  indifference  curve has elasticity 
daldw =  1 +  [yV/(V-V)-l]/(l-r]-p).  (A3) 
Generically this is the same as (A3). However,  since 7l+ p=l/E>l  there is 
necessarily  no overmanning  in the cooperative  equilibrium. 
A  straightforward  extension,  relevant  to Section  4,  is to introduce  a 
third, non-unionised  factor of production.  This could be capital or could 
be highly  skilled or managerial labour. Provided this factor is a substitute 
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accompanies  a reduction  in union  power  will tend to be associated  with 
an increase in the return to that factor if it is in fixed supply. 
For instance  consider  the special case where  the elasticity of substitu- 
tion between  the three inputs  is the same.  Then the elasticities of labour 
demand  with  respect  to wages  and  the  overmanning  coefficients  con- 
tinue  to be described  by equations  (A2) (A3=1 if the third factor is non- 
unionised).  Now  consider  a  reduction  in  union  power.  In  a  general 
equilibrium  where  the  replacement  ratio for unionised  labour is  kept 
constant,  an increase  in productivity  and  real wages  for both  types  of 
union  labor results  (provided  certain conditions  on the parameters are 
fulfilled).  However,  if W12  is the equilibrium wage  for unionised  labour 
and W3  is the payment  to the third factor it is easily shown  that: 
dw31dwl2  =  (Si + S2)(1-cE)/[(S1 +  )(1(  - ce)-(1  -  )].  (A13) 
Hence  for a small elasticity of substitution  a reduction in union power is 
not  only  associated  with  an  increase  in  the  real wages  of  unionised 
labour, but also a shift in differentials in favour of the third factor. 
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Thatcherism has one feature in common  with Reaganism.  Whatever the 
verdict of historians  about the ultimate wisdom  of the economic  policies 
for the  nations  involved,  the  policies  have  been  a boon  for economic 
science,  providing  natural experiments  in the impact of changing  mac- 
roeconomic  policies  and philosophies. 
The  paper  by  Bean  and  Symons  provides  a useful  and  provocative 
survey of major recent developments  in the British economy.  In evaluat- 
ing the Thatcher experiment,  I will focus  on two particular issues  of the 
1980s: the inflation-unemployment  experience  and the trends in produc- 
tivity and output. 
Inflation  and Unemployment 
Observers  of recent  inflation  and  unemployment,  in Britain as well  as 
continental  Europe,  have been  struck by the rising trends in unemploy- 
ment  along  with  the apparent  stickiness  of wage  inflation  in the latter 
half  of  the  1980s.  The  experience  is  devastating  to  modern  rational- 
expectations  theories  or models  which  assume  that the economy  moves 
quickly toward its long-run equilibrium. Moreover, it provides little com- 
fort to  conventional  modern  natural-rate  Phillips-curve  theory,  which 
cannot  explain  why  inflation  does  not continue  to decline  with  rates of 
unemployment  that are presumably  well above the natural rates. 
With respect  to new  classical theories,  economic  policies  in the U. S. 
and the U. K. after 1979 provided  good  laboratories to test the credibility 
hypothesis,  which  states  that  credible  and  publicly  stated  policies  to 
curb inflation  would  lead  to a more  rapid and  less  costly  reduction  in 
inflation  than would  traditional approaches.  Tests for the United  States 
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indicate that the structural wage-price  equations  were remarkably stable 
during the monetary  experiment  from 1979 to 1982. 
An analogous  test is presented  by Bean and Symons  in Table 3, where 
they  calculate "sacrifice ratios" for the U.K. and other countries.  At the 
outset,  it should  be noted  that these  tests are not comparable with other 
calculations  (such as those  of R. J. Gordon), for they take the benchmark 
unemployment  rate  as  the  actual unemployment  rates  in  1980 rather 
than  the  natural unemployment  rates  over  the  period;  for the  United 
States,  this  approach  underestimates  the  sacrifice ratio by  a factor of 
approximately  two.  In  addition,  they  examine  the  unemployment- 
sacrifice ratio rather than the output-sacrifice  ratio. 
Setting  aside  analytical  difficulties,  the  numerical  results  are hardly 
comforting  to the credibility hypothesis.  The U. K. sacrifice ratio ranks 
third out of seven  even  though  most would  agree that the U. K. had the 
most  draconian anti-inflation  policies  of any of the countries.  It is inter- 
esting  to note  as well  that the country  with  the most  deeply  imbedded 
hostility  to inflation,  Germany, has the highest  sacrifice ratio-a  finding 
that is inconsistent  with the well-known  Lucas international evidence  on 
inflation and unemployment. 
It should  be  noted  that modern  neo-Keynesian  natural-rate Phillips- 
curve  theories  have  great  difficulties  in  explaining  wage-price  move- 
ments  over the  1980s in the U. K. and in much  of Europe. Attempts  to 
find stable Phillips curves have proven elusive,  except perhaps for Japan 
and the U. S.1 
This  crisis  has  produced  a  wide  variety  of  approaches.  The  most 
popular  approach  is  to  allow  for  "hysteresis"  in  the  natural  rate  of 
unemployment-that  is,  to  allow  the  natural  rate  to  track the  actual 
unemployment  rate. The paper by Bean and Symons  follows  this tradi- 
tion and includes  a number  of variables that might  plausibly  affect the 
natural rate. As I read their results  (presented  implicitly in Figure 1 and 
Table 4),  the  natural  rate in  Britain rose  from under  2 percent  before 
1970 to a peak of 13 percent  in the early 1980s and since then has fallen 
to around 7 percent. 
The general  line of reasoning  of the hysteresis  approach is troubling. 
There  seems  little  reason  to  question  the  fact  that  standard  Phillips 
curves  appear  highly  unstable  in Britain and other European countries 
during  the  1980s. The most  straightforward  reaction to that fact would 
be  to  conclude  that  the  underlying  Phillips  curve  mechanism  is  mis- 
1. A study outlining  the difficulties  of standard  Phillips  curves  and showing the drift  in the 
implicit  natural  rate of unemployment is David T. Coe, "Nominal  Wages, the NAIRU, 
and Wage  Flexibility,"  OECD  Economic  Studies,  No. 5, Autumn 1985,  pp. 87-126. Comment  *  63 
specified.  Natural-rate theories have little appeal if the natural unemploy- 
ment rate is as variable as the actual unemployment  rate. 
The usual  approach,  however,  is to attempt to model  the natural rate 
as  a function  of  a number  of  variables  that  could  plausibly  affect  the 
labor market.  I find the argument  presented  in Bean and Symons  even 
less  convincing  than  the hysteresis  models  developed  in other studies. 
One  difficulty  lies  in  the  basic  relation,  equation  (2),  or in  the  actual 
equation  estimated  (p. 31). It is misleading  to label this a reduced  form, 
for the equation  is not derived  from a set of structural equations.  More- 
over,  it seems  misspecified  in  omitting  any  wage  and  price variables. 
Most significantly, it completely  omits any variables that could be instru- 
ments  for the aggregate  demand. 
The results are also unconvincing.  The results of the U. K. equation (p. 
31) are inconsistent  with  the pooled  cross-section  results (on p. 33). The 
crucial union  density  variable has  different  signs  in the two  equations. 
Another  variable which  seems  ad hoc is the aging variable (POP), which 
represents  the proportion  of the population  born after 1930 and who are, 
according to Bean and Symons,  "more willing  to risk unemployment  as 
fewer  workers  are able to recall the experience  of mass  unemployment 
during  the  interwar  years."  Does  this  variable show  up  in unemploy- 
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ment  rates of different  cohorts?  Why  do  those  unemployed  since  1980 
not begin  to develop  unemployment-aversion  as well? 
In addition,  there is some  ambiguity  about whether  the tax variables 
are influencing  the demand  or supply  side.  Finally, it seems  inappropri- 
ate to assume  that the  demand  effects  can be captured by a stationary 
error term and  by  the  lagged  unemployment  rate. The Thatcher years 
changed  the pattern of policy from Stop-Go-Stop-Go  to Stop-Stop-Stop- 
Stop;  if  policy  affects  aggregate  demand,  this  implies  that  either  the 
autoregressive  structure  of  the  errors or the  coefficient  on  the  lagged 
unemployment  rate would  change  during the Thatcher years. 
In the end,  I believe  that the equations  are capturing a change  in the 
unemployment-wage-price  structure that is associated with a depression 
economy.  After all, depressions  are qualitatively  different  from normal 
times.  Perhaps labor markets,  along  with  price and wage  behavior,  be- 
have  differently  during  periods  of extended  slack; perhaps  our models 
simply  will  not extrapolate  into  depression  epochs.  One reason  for the 
change  in structure might  be a downward  rigidity of the nominal  wage 
rate,  which  bends  the  long-run  (or at least  the  medium-run)  Phillips 
curve  at very  low  inflation  rates.  Another  possible  regime  shift  is  the 
mass migration of workers from the labor force. I am selling no particular 
theory  of  regime  change;  rather, I am  suggesting  that we  cannot  use 
"good-time"  models  to understand  the dynamics  of wages,  prices,  and 
unemployment  in bad times. 
The other  fascinating  fact about the Thatcher regime  is the improve- 
ment  in  productivity  during  the  1980s.  To begin  with,  there  is  little 
dispute  about  the  fact that the  U.K.  succeeded  in reversing  its lagging 
productivity  growth  better than most  other industrial countries.  On the 
whole,  I agree with  the interpretation  in the Bean-Symons  paper. I had 
always  been  struck by the fact that Britain was the only exception  to the 
convergence  hypothesis  among  large  countries,  as  I remarked  in  my 
1982 study.2 If in  fact  Mrs.  T was  able  to  break  the  cartels,  unions, 
university  tenure  systems,  and other groups  that were  preventing  Brit- 
ain from converging  toward  the technological  frontier, then  we  should 
join in a chorus of "She's a jolly good  lady." 
While  this  line  of  reasoning  is  plausible,  I do  not  find  the  authors' 
empirical  evidence  supports  their  hypothesis.  The authors  emphasize 
the role of multiple  unions  as an important factor in inhibiting  efficient 
reorganizations.  While the argument  seems  plausible on its face, we are 
unable  to  judge  the  quantitative  significance  of  British-style  unions. 
2. William D. Nordhaus,  "Economic Policy in the Face of Declining  Productivity Growth," 
European  Economic  Review, 1982. Comment  *  65 
Surely, the change  in multiple  unions  shown  in Table 9 is insufficient  to 
cause  the  widespread  productivity  gains.  The  only  direct  evidence  is 
presented  in Table 10, which  indicates  that unions  are favorable to TFP 
growth.  Would  not  Thatcherism  have  lowered TFP through  its  union- 
busting  campaign? 
While  much  has  been  made  of the  startling gains  to productivity  in 
Britain, we  might  ask whether  the game was worth the candle.  Say that 
we  agree  with  the  Olsen  hypothesis  that it was  necessary  to break the 
chains  of labor and  business  cartels in Britain; say that this  required a 
blood-letting  depression  such as we have witnessed;  and say that Mrs. T 
was  just  the  person  to  draw  the  blood.  We can  still weigh  costs  and 
benefits. 
Figure 1 gives  a simple account of the dilemma.  We show in that figure 
British  potential  output  under  Thatcher  (calculated  from  actual  GDP 
assuming  an Okun's  Law coefficient  of 2 and a potential unemployment 
rate of 4 percent).  We assume  that Mrs. T's policies  were  able to raise 
British productivity  growth  by  .5 percent  per  year  for a decade.3 The 
alternative path of potential output is shown  in Figure 1 as "Labor  Poten- 
tial GDP." Finally, we  show  the actual path of output  through  the fore- 
cast for 1989 and bring actual output  back to potential  output  over the 
coming  decade. 
Figure 2 shows  the cumulative  losses  and gains from this calculation. 
If we  do  not  discount  future  output,  then  the  gains  from  the  higher 
productivity  growth  will offset the losses  from the depression  sometime 
in the first decade  of the next century. If we  discount  the future output 
gains at 6 percent per annum,  then  the losses  of the 1980s will never be 
regained. 
This calculation of the gains and losses  from Thatcherism is obviously 
dependent  upon  the  precise  assumptions  about  future  productivity 
growth.  But is  does  remind  us  that whatever  productivity  gains  have 
been  achieved  in  Britain did  not  come  cheaply.  Put  differently,  even 
though productivity  growth may have been higher in the 1980s under Mrs. 
T, output was probably lower than it would  otherwise  have been.  And it 
is useful  to note  that the Cheerful Economics  of Mr. R in America man- 
aged  to raise productivity  growth  sharply without  the same  prolonged 
depression  that still haunts  Britain. 
3. The assumption about the productivity  rebound  is crucial  to the figure. This number  is 
obtained  by assuming that one-half  of the rebound  in British  productivity  from  1973-79 
to 1979-87 (see Bean  and Symons, Table  5) is due to the Thatcher  reforms.  Alternatively, 
if it is assumed that the differential  growth between the U.K. and other countries is 
halved (see the equation  on p. 36), then the productivity  acceleration  is about .5 percent 
per annum. 66 *NORDHAUS 
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The authors  remind  us that the stated purpose  of Thatcherism was to 
reduce inflation.  Given  the heavy  output  losses  shown  in Figure 2, I am 
reminded  of some  words  of James Tobin, who  was  reflecting upon  the 
postwar  experience  in the United States: 
The  whole  purpose  of the economy  is production  of goods or services  for consump- 
tion now or in the future. I think the burden  of proof  should always be on those 
who would produce  less rather  than more, on those  who would leave idle men or 
machines or land that could be used. It is amazing how many reasons can be 
found to justify such waste:  fear of inflation, balance-of-payments  deficits, unbal- 
anced budgets, excessive national debt  ....  Too  often the means are accorded 
precedence  over the ends.4 
In the end,  putting  aside the non-economic  issues  such as the evils of 
socialism,  we  can judge  the Thatcher period by whether  the austerity of 
the period beginning  in 1980 (and not yet ended in 1989) will raise British 
national  income  and  output.  Given  the  steep  economic  losses  of  the 
1980s,  it will  be  many  years  before  a higher  productivity  growth  will 
provide  sufficient  gains  to offset  the cumulative  losses.  Perhaps Britain 
4. James Tobin, National Economic  Policy: Essays, pp.  vii-viii. Comment 67 
will never  recover  the losses  of the  1980s. All this serves  as a reminder 
that depressions  and class wars resemble  conventional  wars and strikes 
in being negative-sum  games in which the losses  of the suffering genera- 
tion are never recouped. 
Comment 
WALTER  ELTIS 
Director  General  of the National  Economic  Development  Office,  London 
The paper by Charles Bean and James Symons  provides  one of the most 
statistically balanced  and thought  provoking  analyses  of what has been 
achieved  in Mrs.  Thatcher's  first ten  years.  Some  matters  of emphasis 
are of course  open  to criticism. Thus when  Bean and Symons  write: 
The most obvious  failure [of the Thatcher  years] has been the level of unemploy- 
ment .  ..[p. 21] The unemployment  rate, which peaked  at 11.8% in 1985, has 
reached  levels second only to those experienced  during the Great  Depression  (p. 
15). 
they  fail to  put  the  complete  10-year unemployment  record into  per- 
spective. 
Official  United  Kingdom  unemployment  fell  from  11.8% in  1985 to 
11.1% in  1986,  10.0% in  1987,  8.1% in  1988,  and  7.5% in  May  1989. 
United Kingdom  unemployment  is therefore now  lower than in France, 
Italy, and  most  of the  other  EC economies.  It is a little surprising  that 
their table which  puts  "the UK's unemployment  experience  in interna- 
tional context" [Table 3 on p. 23] should  quote comparative data only for 
1985 when  United  Kingdom  unemployment  peaked  at 11.8% instead  of 
a later year when  it was relatively low by West European standards. The 
11.8% at which  unemployment  peaked  was  very  far below  the  21.3% 
unemployment  of 1931. 
It is widely  agreed that the rapid rate of fall of United Kingdom unem- 
ployment  owes  something  to increased  strictness  in the administration 
of unemployment  benefit  rules with the result that some of the recorded 
fall reflects the removal  of names  from the register as a consequence  of 
administrative  action; but there is a variety of evidence  which  points  to 
increasing  tightness  in the labour market over much of the United King- 
dom,  so  a very  significant  fall in  unemployment  has  unquestionably 
occurred. 
But this  has  been  quite  recent.  The  growth  of  the  United  Kingdom 
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reached  levels second only to those experienced  during the Great  Depression  (p. 
15). 
they  fail to  put  the  complete  10-year unemployment  record into  per- 
spective. 
Official  United  Kingdom  unemployment  fell  from  11.8% in  1985 to 
11.1% in  1986,  10.0% in  1987,  8.1% in  1988,  and  7.5% in  May  1989. 
United Kingdom  unemployment  is therefore now  lower than in France, 
Italy, and  most  of the  other  EC economies.  It is a little surprising  that 
their table which  puts  "the UK's unemployment  experience  in interna- 
tional context" [Table 3 on p. 23] should  quote comparative data only for 
1985 when  United  Kingdom  unemployment  peaked  at 11.8% instead  of 
a later year when  it was relatively low by West European standards. The 
11.8% at which  unemployment  peaked  was  very  far below  the  21.3% 
unemployment  of 1931. 
It is widely  agreed that the rapid rate of fall of United Kingdom unem- 
ployment  owes  something  to increased  strictness  in the administration 
of unemployment  benefit  rules with the result that some of the recorded 
fall reflects the removal  of names  from the register as a consequence  of 
administrative  action; but there is a variety of evidence  which  points  to 
increasing  tightness  in the labour market over much of the United King- 
dom,  so  a very  significant  fall in  unemployment  has  unquestionably 
occurred. 
But this  has  been  quite  recent.  The  growth  of  the  United  Kingdom 68 *  ELTIS 
economy  accelerated  sharply  in  1986 to a rate between  4% and 5% per 
annum  (according to the output  measure  of GNP which  has proved  the 
most accurate), and that is the principal reason why  unemployment  has 
fallen  so  sharply.  Manufacturing  productivity  has  also  advanced  very 
rapidly in these  two  years (by 16%), which  reflects the improvement  in 
the United Kingdom's  overall supply  side performance. 
The superior growth  and unemployment  performance in 1986-88 has 
been  partly due  to an unsustainably  rapid growth  of demand.  During 
1988, real United  Kingdom  consumption  grew by 6.5% and real invest- 
ment by 10% to produce  a growth  of real domestic  demand  of over 7.5% 
of which  about 3% had to be met from overseas,  and this has produced a 
?12 billion  deterioration  in  the  current account  of the  balance  of  pay- 
ments.  At the same time the underlying  rates of wage and price inflation 
have accelerated and the government  has had to take corrective action to 
slow  the growth  of demand.  This may produce a cyclical peak in 1989 or 
1990 (not 1988 as Bean and Symons  suggest  because  1989 output is so far 
running some 4% above 1988 levels)  so that statistics for a complete  cycle 
from the  1979 peak  to a further peak in 1989 or 1990 will in due  course 
become  available.  This  genuine  10-11  year  cycle  is  likely  to  include 
further above average growth in 1988-90  and show  faster overall annual 
growth  rates than the Bean and Symons  statistics which  include  all the 
negative  data from the 1979-81  recession  but not yet all the positive  data 
from the subsequent  boom. 
There is of course  a considerable  possibility  that the United Kingdom 
authorities  will be able to achieve  a slowdown  in the growth of demand 
to a sustainable  rate in 1989-90 without  actually creating a cyclical down- 
turn,  and  this will  be easier  to achieve  if the  acceleration of growth  in 
1986-88  contains  a significant  element  that stems  from sustainable  sup- 
ply side improvements.  Bean and Symons  document  the extent to which 
marginal  rates  of  United  Kingdom  taxation  on  high  personal  incomes 
were reduced  in 1980 and on corporate profits in 1983 and any beneficial 
effects on supply  from these will be quite significantly lagged,  so it is not 
implausible  that  the  main  favourable  effects  only  came  through  after 
1985. There was  also  extensive  deregulation  to assist  small businesses, 
which  have  grown  very  rapidly. Bean and  Symons  themselves,  in the 
most  interesting  part of their paper,  attach considerable  weight  to the 
favorable influence  on labour productivity  of trade union legislation  that 
reduced restrictive practices and union power. There has been a reinforc- 
ing consideration  which  helps  to explain why  many private sector trade 
unionists  have  entirely  voluntarily  cooperated  with  management  to an 
increasing  degree  in the 1980s. 
In the pre-Thatcher cycle between  the cyclical peaks of 1973 and 1979 Comment  69 
the real net of tax earnings  of the average worker increased at an annual 
rate of  only  0.9% per  annum  while  the  net  pre-tax rate of  return  on 
capital of non-North  Sea companies  fell from 8.9% to 5.6%. From 1979 to 
1988 the net of tax earnings  of the average worker rose at the far faster 
annual rate of 3.0% with the result that the real incomes of those in work 
rose by approximately  one-third  in Mrs. Thatcher's first nine-and-a-half 
years.  At the  same  time the pre-tax net rate of return of non-North  Sea 
companies  rose from 5.6% in 1979 to 10.2% in 1987 (which has probably 
risen by a further fifth since).  A consequence  of the rapid productivity 
recovery which  Bean and Symons  began to track has therefore been that 
workers  in  work  and  companies  have  been  able  to  enjoy  very  rapid 
simultaneous  increases  in both  wages  and profits.  The near stagnation 
of wages  and  the  decline  of  real rates of return on  capital in  1973-79 
encouraged  zero  sum  behaviour  by  trade unions  where  one  group  of 
workers  was  mainly  able to  gain  extra real incomes  at the  expense  of 
profits or of other  workers  via the  exercise  of the  short-term power  to 
disrupt  production.  As  the  Thatcher  boom  in  which  real wages  and 
profits  have  both  risen  rapidly  developed,  the  conditions  for positive 
sum behaviour  have  gradually  emerged  and labour relations have now 
moved  toward a situation where all parties realise that they stand to gain 
far more  from sustained  increases  in production  and productivity  than 
from relative income  shifts achieved  via threats to disrupt the productive 
process.  The  unwillingness  of  most  workers  in  the  private  sector  to 
support  strike action  may  well  owe  something  to the  large gains  they 
have been able to achieve  via cooperation  to achieve continual advances 
in  productivity  and  improvements  in  international  competitiveness. 
Bean and Symons  recognise  the importance of this line of argument and 
they  add,  "Once workers  have  experienced  the higher  incomes  gener- 
ated by a more efficient,  productive  economy,  they are unlikely  to want 
to revert to the status quo ante." 
It is widely  perceived  that there have  also been  considerable  gains in 
the quality of management,  but Bean and Symons  remark (p. 42): 
. . . if improved  management  were the  key, then  one might  expect  capital  produc- 
tivity as well as labour  productivity  to have improved.  Yet  the table  [8. on p. 40] 
suggests that even after 1979 most of the TFP [Total  Factor  Productivity]  growth 
seems to have been labour-augmenting  in nature. 
They rightly say that "one should  not push this too far," and especially 
since  the  extent  to which  productivity  growth  is capital-augmenting  is 
extremely  difficult to measure.  This is partly because  technical progress 
which  is capital-augmenting  ex ante will lead to a consequent  substitu- 70 *  ELTIS 
tion  of  capital for labour  so  that much  of what  occurs  ex post  will  be 
indistinguishable  from the consequences  of labour-augmenting  technical 
progress.  This will be  precisely  the  case if the elasticity  of substitution 
between  labour and  capital is unity, and if it is closer to 0.6 or 0.7 as is 
widely  supposed,  subsequent  substitutions  will still disguise  most of the 
precise  effects  of  capital  augmentation.  The  difficulties  are of  course 
compounded  by  the  distortions  which  influence  the  relation  between 
marginal products  and  factor returns in most  industries.  For these  rea- 
sons,  and because  the statistical findings  which Bean and Symons  use to 
reject capital-augmenting  technical progress  (in Table 8) are rather tenu- 
ous,  the  suggestion  that productivity  advances  in the United  Kingdom 
have  been  exclusively  labour  augmenting  need  not  be  accepted.  The 
official data show  real investment  net of capital consumption  in manufac- 
turing  industry  totalling  a mere  ?64 millions  or less  than  0.1% of  the 
capital stock in the four years 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987. The output  of 
manufacturing  industry  rose  13% in these  four years,  and to be able to 
produce  13% more with  negligible  recorded net investment  is compati- 
ble  with  the  presence  of  a good  deal  of  capital-augmenting  technical 
progress.  If this  has  indeed  been  present  on  a considerable  scale,  the 
hypothesis  that  assets  have  been  more  efficiently  managed  in  a wide 
range  of  industries  ceases  to  be  unacceptable;  it  may  be  added  that 
extremely  cooperative  trade unions  have  allowed  managers  to manage 
these  assets  far more effectively  than in the 1970s. 
This Comment  has focused  on the microeconomic  aspects of Bean and 
Symons'  account.  So far as the macroeconomic  management  of the econ- 
omy is concerned,  the government  has succeeded  in reducing price infla- 
tion from the more than  10% rates of the  1970s to an underlying  4% to 
5% from  1982 onward,  but it has  so  far failed to arrive at a consistent 
macroeconomic  framework  for the  guidance  of policy.  Virtually every 
target announced  has  had  to be quite rapidly modified,  for essentially 
pragmatic reasons.  In 1988-89 the United Kingdom has a budget surplus 
of  between  3% and  4% of  GNP  (when  the  most  recently  enunciated 
principle  to guide  budgetary  policy  called  for a balanced  budget).  De- 
spite  this  and  negligible  public  expenditure  growth,  the  expansion  of 
real demand  accelerated  to  an  unsustainable  7.5%.  Precise  monetary 
targets have  not had a direct influence  on policy since about 1985, quite 
largely because  only  the demand  function  for the narrowest measure  of 
the money  supply  MO has  shown  any stability. In practice the govern- 
ment has endeavoured  to maintain a stable inflation rate via well judged 
movements  in short-term  interest  rates that have a considerable  impact 
on  the  exchange  rate which  in  turn influences  the  inflation  rate.  This 
pragmatic approach came adrift in 1987-88 when interest rates and there- Discussion 71 
fore the exchange  rate were  set too low to stabilise inflation and the rate 
of  growth  of  real demand.  The  United  Kingdom  has  nonetheless  en- 
joyed  eight  years  of uninterrupted  growth  since  1981 and considerable 
stability in inflation.  The government  has judged  that this together with 
supply  side-oriented  reductions  in personal  and company  taxation pro- 
vide the best available environment  for companies  and their workers to 
take long  term decisions  which  can be expected  to promote growth  and 
international competitiveness. 
If substantial  supply  side improvements  have begun  to come through 
from  about  1985 onwards  as  this  Comment  suggests,  then  these  are 
probably the most important outcomes  of the policies of Mrs. Thatcher's 
governments.  It is moreover  entirely  plausible  that the buoyancy  of in- 
vestment  and  consumption  that  has  followed  from  supply  side  suc- 
cesses  and  the  consequent  growth  of new  small businesses  has  had  a 
positive  impact  on  aggregate  demand  that  even  a budget  surplus  of 
more than 3% of the national income  has so far failed to restrain. 
Discussion 
Charles Bean replied to Nordhaus  that the regressions  were intended  as 
reduced  forms,  so that there was  no need  to include  aggregate demand 
explicitly, and  that  even  so  results  are similar if the  change  in GDP is 
included  in the regression.  He also suggested  that the change in produc- 
tivity  was  not  due  to  a move  away  from  multi-unionism,  but  that  a 
decrease in union  power meant that the distortions from multi-unionism 
were less important.  In response  to Eltis, Bean noted  that they only had 
data through  1987, and that the recent increase in output  can be attrib- 
uted almost wholly  to increases  in consumption. 
Robert  Gordon  questioned  Nordhaus's  cost-benefit  analysis  of  the 
Thatcher years. He indicated that the comparison depends  on the compa- 
rability of the US economy  in the  1930's with  the economy  in the post- 
war  and  on  the  comparability  of  the  postwar  US and  UK economies, 
neither  or which  he  found  convincing.  He noted  that inflation  showed 
little persistence  in the prewar period,  while  it is very persistent  in the 
postwar,  and that the US appears to have a stable natural rate of unem- 
ployment,  unlike in the UK. 
Robert Hall  questioned  why  the  move  to free markets  is associated 
with  adverse  changes  in  income  distribution,  contrary to  the  classical 
view.  He  speculated  that reducing  inflation  has  costs  which  offset  the 
structural  benefits  of  free  markets.  Matthew  Shapiro  responded  that 
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most  of the changes  in income  distribution  were  due  to changes  in tax 
rates that accompanied  the  move  to free markets,  though  Bean noted 
that in the UK even  the pretax income  distribution has widened. 
John Campbell  questioned  that relation  between  market power  and 
multi-unionism.  He noted that the integration of the European market in 
1992 may lower the amount  of monopoly  power and thus lead to a more 
US-style union  sector. Bean agreed with this view. 
William  Brainard  thought  it  was  inappropriate  to  examine  British 
disinflation  independent  of  the  world  disinflation.  Olivier  Blanchard 
asked whether  the decrease in manning  restrictions should  have a once- 
and-for-all effect on productivity,  or whether  they were preventing  Brit- 
ish catch-up  in the  world  economy  and  thus  would  have  a permanent 
effect. Bean replied that he thought  the removal of manning  restrictions 
had a once-and-for-all  effect. 
Eltis questioned  whether  the recent output  increase was really due to 
consumption.  He noted  that while  consumer  spending  is up,  corporate 
and  government  saving  have  increased  a well.  William Nordhaus  de- 
fended  his indictment  of Thatcher policy. If the hysteresis  view of unem- 
ployment  is  incorrect,  then  Thatcher produced  a depression  to  lower 
inflation.  If the  hysteresis  view  is correct, then  deflationary  policy  has 
very  long-lasting  effects.  Robert Hall  suggested  that  the  authors  use 
their data to identify  the bias in technological  change.  The bias can be 
uncovered,  he  suggested,  by  examine  the  relation between  the  Solow 
residual in Table 15 and the shares of capital and labor. 